Wikileaks and American Embassy leaked documents

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Wikileaks and American Embassy leaked documents

Unread post by ኦሽንoc » 29 Nov 2010 22:00

Wikileaks revealed
leaked United States embassy cables on Sunday
including 1,395 cables from Ethiopian Embassy.
Below are a selection of the documents from a cache of a quarter-million confidential American diplomatic cables that WikiLeaks intends to make public starting on Nov. 28. A small number of names and passages in some of the cables have been removed by The New York Times to protect diplomats’ confidential sources, to keep from compromising American intelligence efforts or to protect the privacy of ordinary citizens.

-- Profile on the Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi

Image



I will post more wikileaks public documents

More documents can be found in New york times and The guardian.

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Wikileaks and American Embassy leaked documents - Libya Gadd

Unread post by ኦሽንoc » 29 Nov 2010 23:06

Wikileaks revealed
leaked United States embassy cables on Sunday
including 1,395 cables from Ethiopian Embassy.
Below are a selection of the documents from a cache of a quarter-million confidential American diplomatic cables that WikiLeaks intends to make public starting on Nov. 28. A small number of names and passages in some of the cables have been removed by The New York Times to protect diplomats’ confidential sources, to keep from compromising American intelligence efforts or to protect the privacy of ordinary citizens.

-- Profile on the Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi







Date
2009-09-29 17:21:00
Source
Embassy Tripoli
Classification
SECRET//NOFORN
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000771
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND INR.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/29/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, LY, PINR
SUBJECT: A GLIMPSE INTO LIBYAN LEADER QADHAFI'S ECCENTRICITIES
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S/NF) Summary: Recent first-hand experiences with Libyan
Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi and his staff, primarily in
preparation for his UNGA trip, provided rare insights into
Qadhafi's inner circle and personal proclivities. Qadhafi
appears to rely heavily
–––– –––– –––– –––– ––––
, and
reportedly cannot travel with his senior Ukrainian nurse, Galyna
Kolotnytska. He also appears to have an intense dislike or fear
of staying on upper floors, reportedly prefers not to fly over
water, and seems to enjoy horse racing and flamenco dancing.
His recent travel may also suggest a diminished dependence on
his legendary female guard force, as only one woman bodyguard
accompanied him to New York. End Summary.
QADHAFI'S PERSONALITY REFLECTED IN HIS PHOBIAS
2. (S/NF) Muammar al-Qadhafi has been described as both
mercurial and eccentric, and our recent first-hand experiences
with him and his office, primarily in preparation for his UNGA
trip, demonstrated the truth of both characterizations. From
the moment Qadhafi's staff began to prepare for his travel to
the United States,
–––– –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– ––––,
–––– ––––, –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– ––––
of
his 40-year rule, various proclivities and phobias began to
reveal themselves in every logistical detail. When applying for
Qadhafi's visa,
–––– ––––
asked whether it was necessary
for the Leader to submit a portrait of himself that fit consular
application regulations, noting that his photo was displayed
throughout the city and that anyone of hundreds of billboards
could be photographed and shrunken to fit the application's
criteria. When the rule was enforced,
–––– ––––
reluctantly conceded to take a portrait of the Leader
specifically for the visa application.
3. (S/NF) When
––––
began to search for proper
accommodations for Qadhafi,
––––
informed us that the Leader
must stay on the first floor of any facility that was rented for
him. (
––––
separately told U.S. officials in Washington that
Qadhafi could not climb more than 35 steps.)
––––
cited this
requirement as the primary reason that the Libyan residence in
New Jersey was selected as the preferred accommodation site
rather than the Libyan PermRep's residence in New York City.

––––
also sought to find accommodations with room to pitch
Qadhafi's Bedouin tent, Qadhafi's traditional site for receiving
visitors and conducting meetings, as it offers him a non-verbal
way of communicating that he is a man close to his cultural
roots.
4. (S/NF) Qadhafi's dislike of long flights and apparent fear of
flying over water also caused logistical headaches for his
staff. When discussing flight clearances with Emboffs,
––––
explained that the Libyan delegation would arrive from Portugal,
as Qadhafi "cannot fly more than eight hours" and would need to
overnight in Europe prior to continuing his journey to New York.

––––
also revealed in the same conversation that Qadhafi
does not like to fly over water. Presumably for similar
reasons, Qadhafi's staff also requested a stop in Newfoundland
to break his travel from Venezuela to Libya on September 29.
[Note: The Government of Canada recently confirmed that the
Libyan delegation canceled plans to stop in Newfoundland. End
Note.]
DEPENDENCIES: RELIANCE ON A SELECTIVE GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS
5. (S/NF) Qadhafi appears to be almost obsessively dependent on
a small core of trusted personnel. This group includes

–––– –––– ––––, –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– ––––
–––– –––– –––– ––––
coordinate the logistics of Qadhafi's
visit.
––––
balanced the UNGA preparations between equally
frenetic preparations for the August 31 African Union (AU)
Summit and September 1 celebration of Qadhafi's coup.
––––'––––
–––– –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– ––––
––––.
At large events such as the August 31 AU Summit and
September 1 celebrations,
–––– –––– ––––
every last
detail of these complex gatherings, ranging from the overall
program to the position of the press pool. At UNGA,
––––
–––– ––––
Qadhafi to the podium at the UNGA and

–––– ––––
his papers and props upon the conclusion of
the Leader's remarks. Long-time Qadhafi Chief of Staff Bashir
Salah appears to play an equally important role in Qadhafi's
personal retinue, and
–––– –––– –––– ––––
via an
old-fashioned green phone
–––– ––––'–––– ––––
. It is next to a
red phone, which presumably connects to Qadhafi himself. We
constantly hear that National Security Adviser and son,
Muatassim, also plays a key role as his father's confidante and
handler during travel abroad. Muatassim also seems to have been
tasked with insuring that the Leader's image is well-preserved
through the full array of carefully-planned media events.
6. (S/NF) Finally, Qadhafi relies heavily on his long-time
Ukrainian nurse, Galyna Kolotnytska, who has been described as a
"voluptuous blonde." Of the rumored staff of four Ukrainian
nurses that cater to the Leader's health and well-being,
––––
–––– ––––
emphasized to multiple Emboffs that Qadhafi
cannot travel without Kolotnytska, as she alone "knows his
routine." When Kolotnytska's late visa application resulted in
her Security Advisory Opinion being received on the day
Qadhafi's party planned to travel to the U.S., the Libyan
Government sent a private jet to ferry her from Libya to
Portugal to meet up with the Leader during his rest-stop. Some
embassy contacts have claimed that Qadhafi and the 38 year-old
Kolotnytska have a romantic relationship. While he did not
comment on such rumors, a Ukrainian political officer recently
confirmed that the Ukrainian nurses "travel everywhere with the
Leader."
PREFERENCES - FROM DANCING TO HORSEMAN
7. (S/NF) In addition to the personality quirks revealed through
Qadhafi's travel to New York, the Qadhafi's preferences for
dancing and cultural performances were displayed over the last
month. The three-day spectacle of his 40th anniversary in power
included performances by dance troupes from Ukraine, Tunisia,
Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco, as well as musical performances by
bands from Mexico, Russia, New Zealand, and a number of other
nations. Qadhafi appeared particularly enthralled by Tuareg
horse racing during two of the events, clapping and smiling
throughout the races. The flamenco dancers that participated in
his celebratory events appeared to spark a similar interest, as
Qadhafi decided to stop in Seville (for a "personal trip"
according to the Spanish Ambassador here) on his way back to
Libya from Venezuela specifically to attend a flamenco dance
performance. [Note: That stop has reportedly been scrapped for
unknown reasons. End note.]
NO NEW YORK PHOTO OPS - QADHAFI LEAVES FEMALE GUARDS AT HOME
8. (S/NF) While Qadhafi's reported female guard force has become
legendary, it played no role in his travels to New York. Only
one female guard was included among the approximately 350-person
strong Libyan delegation to New York. This is the same female
bodyguard who sticks close to Qadhafi in his domestic and
international public appearances and may, in fact, play some
sort of formal security role. Observers in Tripoli speculate
that the female guard force is beginning to play a diminished
role among the Leader's personal security staff.
9. (S/NF) Comment: Qadhafi's state visits and appearances at
various conferences and summits, both at home and abroad, have
revealed greater details about his personality and character.
While it is tempting to dismiss his many eccentricities as signs
of instability, Qadhafi is a complicated individual who has
managed to stay in power for forty years through a skillful
balancing of interests and realpolitik methods. Continued
engagement with Qadhafi and his inner circle is important not
only to learn the motives and interests that drive the world's
longest serving dictator, but also to help overcome the
misperceptions that inevitably accumulated during Qadhafi's
decades of isolation. As
––––
told us, pointing to a
larger-than-life portrait of Qadhafi, "When you have been
isolated for so long, it is important to communicate." End
comment.
CRETZ

Destination

VZCZCXRO7114
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP
RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTRO #0771/01 2721721
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5305
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0239
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5851




Summary
This 2009 cable offers a colorful profile of the Libyan leader,
Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, by the American ambassador to Libya, Gene A. Cretz.


About the redactions
———
[blockquote]Redacted text[/blockquote]
A small number of names and passages in some of the cables have been removed by The New York Times to protect diplomats’ confidential sources, to keep from compromising American intelligence efforts or to protect the privacy of ordinary citizens.

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Re: Wikileaks and American Embassy leaked documents on Zimba

Unread post by ኦሽንoc » 29 Nov 2010 23:11


Wikileaks document on Ambassador Reports on Zimbabwe’s Leader









Date
2007-07-13 10:04:00
Source
Embassy Harare
Classification
CONFIDENTIAL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000638
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR P, AF, AND AF/S FOR MOZENA AND HILL,
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B.
PITTMAN AND B. LEO; USAID FOR M. COPSON AND E. LOKEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ZI
SUBJECT: The End is Nigh
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4b/d
1. (C) Having said my piece repeatedly over the last three years,
I won't offer a lengthy prescription for our Zimbabwe
policy. My views can be stated very simply as stay the
course and prepare for change. Our policy is working and it's
helping to drive change here. What is required is simply the grit,
determination and focus to see this through. Then, when the changes
finally come we must be ready to move quickly to help consolidate
the new dispensation.
THE SITUATION
2. (C) Robert Mugabe has survived for so long because he is more
clever and more ruthless than any other politician in
Zimbabwe. To give the devil his due, he is a brilliant
tactitian and has long thrived on his ability to abruptly
change the rules of the game, radicalize the political
dynamic and force everyone else to react to his agenda.
However, he is fundamentally hampered by several factors:
his ego and belief in his own infallibility; his obsessive
focus on the past as a justification for everything in the
present and future; his deep ignorance on economic issues
(coupled with the belief that his 18 doctorates give him
the authority to suspend the laws of economics, including
supply and demand); and his essentially short-term,
tactical style.
3. (C) While his tactical skills have kept him in power for 27
years, over the last seven this has only been achieved by a
series of populist, but destructive and ultimately
self-defeating moves. In reaction to losing the 2000
referendum on the constitution, a vengeful Mugabe unleashed
his QGreen BombersQ to commit land reform and in the
process he destroyed ZimbabweQs agricultural sector, once the
bedrock of the economy. While thousands of white farmers
saw their properties seized, hundreds of thousands of black
Zimbabweans lost their livelihoods and were reduced to utter
poverty. In 2005, having been forced to steal victory by
manipulating the results of an election he lost, Mugabe
lashed out again, punishing the urban populace by launching
Operation Murambatsvina. The result was wholesale
destruction of the informal sector, on which as much as
70-80 percent of urban dwellers had depended, and the
uprooting of 700,000 Zimbabweans. The current inflationary
cycle really began with Murambatsvina, as rents and prices
grew in response to a decrease in supply.
4. (C) And now, faced with the hyperinflationary consequences
of his ruinous fiscal policies and growing reliance on the
printing press to keep his government running, Mugabe has
launched Operation Slash Prices. This has once again given
him a very temporary boost in popularity (especially among
the police, who have led the looting of retail outlets and
now seem well positioned to take a leading role in the
black market economy) at the cost of terrible damage to the
country and people. Many small grocery and shop owners,
traders, etc., will be wiped out; the shelves are
increasingly bare; hunger, fear, and tension are growing;
fuel has disappeared. When the shelves are still empty
this time next week, the popular appeal of the price roll
back will evaporate and the government simply doesnQt have
the resources to replace the entire private commercial
sector and keep Zimbabweans fed. It may attempt to do so
by printing more money, adding even more inflationary
pressure on a system already reeling from the GOZQs
quasi-fiscal lunacy combined with the price impact of
pervasive shortages. The increasingly worthless Zim dollar
is likely to collapse as a unit of trade in the near
future, depriving the GOZ of its last economic tool other
than sheer thuggery and theft of othersQ assets.
5. (C) With all this in view, IQm convinced the end is not
HARARE 00000638 002 OF 004
far off for the Mugabe regime. Of course, my predecessors
and many other observers have all said the same thing, and
yet Mugabe is still with us. I think this time could prove
different, however, because for the first time the
president is under intensifying pressure simultaneously on
the economic, political and international fronts. In the
past, he could always play one of these off against the
other, using economic moves to counter political pressure
or playing the old colonial/race/imperialist themes to buy
himself breathing room regionally and internationally. But
he is running out of options and in the swirling gases of
the new Zimbabwean constellation that is starting to form,
the economic, political and international pressures are
concentrating on Mugabe himself. Our ZANU-PF contacts are
virtually unanimous in saying reform is desperately needed,
but won't happen while the Old Man is there, and therefore
he must go (finding the courage to make that happen is
another matter, however, but even that may be coming closer).
This is not some sudden awakening on the road to
Damascus, but a reflection of the pain even party insiders
increasingly feel over the economic meltdown. We also get
regular, albeit anecdotal, reports of angry and
increasingly open mutterings against Mugabe even in ZANU-PF's
traditional rural bastions. Beginning in March, the
other SADC leaders finally recognized (in the wake of the
terrible beatings of March 11 and the international outcry
that followed Q another self-inflicted wound for Mugabe)
that Zimbabwe is a problem they need to address. Thabo
Mbeki appears committed to a successful mediation and is
reportedly increasingly irritated with MugabeQs efforts to
manipulate him or blow him off altogether. If Mugabe
judges that he still commands all he surveys by virtue of
being the elder statesman on the scene, he may be
committing yet another serious blunder. Finally, one does
well to recall that the only serious civil disturbances
here in a decade came in 1998 over bread shortages, showing
that even the famously passive Shona people have their
limits. The terror and oppression of the
intervening years have cowed people, but itQs anyoneQs guess
whether their fear or their anger will win out in the end.
WHAT WILL THE END LOOK LIKE?
6. (C) This is the big, unanswerable question. One thing
at least is certain, Mugabe will not wake up one morning a
changed man, resolved to set right all he has wrought. He
will not go quietly nor without a fight. He will cling to
power at all costs and the costs be damned, he deserves to
rule by virtue of the liberation struggle and land reform and
the people of Zimbabwe have let him down by failing to
appreciate this, thus he neednQt worry about their
well-being. The only scenario in which he might agree to
go with a modicum of good grace is one in which he
concludes that the only way to end his days a free man is
by leaving State House. I judge that he is still a long
way from this conclusion and will fight on for now.
7. (C) The optimal outcome, of course, and the only one that
doesnQt bring with it a huge risk of violence and conflict, is
a genuinely free and fair election, under international
supervision. The Mbeki mediation offers the best, albeit
very slim, hope of getting there. However, as Pretoria
grows more and more worried about the chaos to its north
and President MbekiQs patience with MugabeQs antics wears
thin, the prospects for serious South African engagement
may be growing. Thus, this effort deserves all the support
and backing we can muster. Less attractive is the idea of
a South African-brokered transitional arrangement or
government of national unity. Mbeki has always favored
stability and in his mind this means a ZANU-PF-led GNU, with
perhaps a few MDC additions. This solution is more likely
to prolong than resolve the crisis and we must guard
against letting Pretoria dictate an outcome which
HARARE 00000638 003 OF 004
perpetuates the status quo at the expense of real change
and reform.
8. (C) The other scenarios are all less attractive: a popular
uprising would inevitably entail a bloodbath, even if it
were ultimately successful; MugabeQs sudden, unexpected
death would set off a stampede for power among ZANU-PF
heavy weights; a palace coup, whether initiated within
ZANU-PF or from the military - in which Mugabe is removed,
killed, exiled or otherwise disposed of, could well devolve
into open conflict between the contending successors. Similarly,
some form of "constitutional coup" i.e., a change at the top
engineered within the framework of ZANU-PFQs "legitimate"
structures could well prove to be merely the opening bell
in a prolonged power struggle. None of the players is
likely to go quietly into the night without giving everything
they have, including calling on
their supporters in the security services. Moreover, experience
elsewhere would suggest that whoever comes out on top
initially will struggle, and more than likely fail, to halt
the economic collapse. Thus, there is a good prospect of
not one but a series of rapid-fire Qtransitions,Q until
some new, stable dispensation is reached.
9. (C) The final, and probably worst, possibility is that Mugabe
concludes he can settle for ruling over a rump Zimbabwe,
maintaining control over Harare and the Mashona heartland,
the critical forces of the National Reserve Force and CIO
and a few key assets Q gold, diamonds, platinum and Air
Zimbabwe to fund the good times. Under this scenario the
rest of the country, in one of the comradeQs favorite
phrases, could Qgo hang,Q leaving it to the international
community to stave off the worst humanitarian consequences.
WHAT OF THE OPPOSITION?
10. (C) ZimbabweQs opposition is far from ideal and I leave
convinced that had we had different partners we could have
achieved more already. But you have to play the hand youQre dealt.
With that in mind, the current leadership has little executive
experience and will require massive hand holding and assistance
should they ever come to power.
11. (C) Morgan Tsvangarai is a brave, committed man and, by and
large, a democrat. He is also the only player on the scene
right now with real star quality and the ability to rally
the masses. But Tsvangarai is also a flawed figure, not
readily open to advice, indecisive and with questionable
judgment in selecting those around him. He is the indispensable
element for opposition success, but possibly an albatross around
t heir necks once in power. In short, he is a kind of Lech Walesa
character: Zimbabwe needs him, but should not rely on his executive
abilities to lead the country's recovery. Arthur Mutambara is young
and ambitious, attracted to radical, anti-western rhetoric and
smart as a whip. But, in many respects heQs a light-weight
who has spent too much time reading U.S. campaign messaging
manuals and too little thinking about the real issues. Welshman
Ncube has proven to be a deeply divisive
and destructive player in the opposition ranks and the
sooner he is pushed off the stage, the better. But he is
useful to many, including the regime and South Africa, so
is probably a cross to be borne for some time yet. The
prospects for healing the rift within the MDC seem dim,
which is a totally unnecessary self-inflicted wound on
their part this time. With few exceptions Q Tendayi Biti,
Nelson Chamisa Q the talent is thin below the top ranks.
The great saving grace of the opposition is likely to be
found in the diaspora. Most of ZimbabweQs best
professionals, entrepreneurs, businessmen and women, etc.,
have fled the country. They are the oppositionQs natural
allies and it is encouraging to see signs, particularly in
South Africa and the UK, that these people are talking,
HARARE 00000638 004 OF 004
sharing ideas, developing plans and thinking together about
future recovery.
12. (C) Unfortunately, among the MDCQs flaws is its inability to
work more effectively with the rest of civil society. The
blame for this can be shared on both sides (many civil
society groups, like the NCA, are single-issue focused and
take the overall dynamic in unhelpful directions; others,
like WOZA, insist on going it alone as a matter of
principle), but ultimately it falls to the MDC as the
largest and the only true political party, to show the
way. Once again, however, these are natural allies and
they have more reason to work together than fight against each
other.
STAYING THE COURSE, PREPARING FOR CHANGE
13. (C) If I am right and change is in the offing, we need to
step up our preparations. The work done over the last year on
transition planning has been extremely useful, both for
stimulating a fresh look at our own assumptions and plans
and for forging a common approach among the traditional
donor community. But the process has lagged since the
meetings in March in London and should be re-energized. It is
encouraging in this respect that USAID Washington has
engaged the Mission here in discussing how we would use
additional resources in response to a genuinely
reform-minded government . I hope this will continue and
the good work done so far will survive the usual
bloodletting of the budget process.
14. (C) The official media has had a field day recently whooping
that "Dell leaves Zimbabwe a failed man". That's not quite
how it looks from here. I believe that the firm
U.S. stance, the willingness to speak out and stand up,
have contributed to the accelerating pace of change.
Mugabe and his henchman are like bullies everywhere: if
they can intimidate you they will. But ther're not used to
someone standing up to them and fighting back. It catches them
off guard and that's when they make mistakes. The howls of protest
over critical statements from Washington or negative coverage
on CNN are the clearest proof of how this hurts them. Ditto
the squeals over Qillegal sanctions.Q In addition, the regime
has become so used to calling the shots and dictating the
pace that the merest stumble panics them. Many local
observers have noted that Mugabe is panicked and
desperate about hyperinflation at the moment, and hence heQs
making mistakes. Possibly fatal mistakes. We need to
keep the pressure on in order to keep Mugabe off his game
and on his back foot, relying on his own shortcomings to do
him in. Equally important is an active U.S. leadership
role in the international community. The UK is ham-strung
by its colonial past and domestic politics, thus, letting them
set the pace alone merely limits our effectiveness. The EU is
divided between the hard north and its soft southern
underbelly. The Africans are only now beginning to find
their voice. Rock solid partners like Australia donQt
pack enough punch to step out front and the UN is a
non-player. Thus it falls to the U.S., once again, to take
the lead, to say and do the hard things and to set the agenda.
Hundreds, maybe thousands, of ordinary Zimbabweans of all
kinds have told me that our clear, forthright stance has
given them hope and the courage to hang on. By this regimeQs
standards, acting in the interests of the people may indeed be
considered a failure. But I believe that the opposite is true,
and that we can be justifiably proud that in Zimbabwe we have
helped advance the PresidentQs freedom Agenda. The people of
this country know it and recognize it and that is the true
touchstone of our success here.
DELL

Destination

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RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1869




Summary
As Christopher W. Dell leaves Zimbabwe after three years as American ambassador,

he sends a frank account of its aging, erratic leader, Robert Mugabe.

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Wikileaks and American Embassy leaked documents United natio

Unread post by ኦሽንoc » 29 Nov 2010 23:15


Diplomats Helping American Spies on United nation









Date
2009-07-31 20:24:00
Source
Secretary of State
Classification
SECRET//NOFORN
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 24 STATE 080163
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2034
TAGS: PINR, KSPR, ECON, KPKO, KUNR
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: THE UNITED
NATIONS
REF: STATE 048489
Classified By: MICHAEL OWENS, ACTING DIR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new
National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on the United
Nations (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued
DOS reporting of biographic information relating to the
United Nations (paragraph 2).
A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the 2004 NHCD and
reflects the results of a recent Washington review of
reporting and collection needs focused on the United Nations.
The review produced a comprehensive list of strategic
priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs
(paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as
they allocate resources and update plans to collect
information on the United Nations. The priorities should
also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage
reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission
Strategic Plans (MSPs).
B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National
Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was
established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If
needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and
the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following
each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.
C. (S/NF) Important information often is available to
non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies
participated in the review of this National HUMINT Collection
Directive. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can
assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to
encourage relevant reporting through their own or State
Department channels.
2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting:
A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State
reporting officers for much of the biographical information
collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email
and other means is vital to the community's collection
efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for
dissemination to the IC.
B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the
following information as possible when they have information
relating to persons linked to : office and
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organizational titles; names, position titles and other
information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell
phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information,
such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic
format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and
intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site
identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent
flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant
biographical information.
3. (S/NF) Priority issues and issues outline:
A. Key Near-Term Issues
1) Darfur/Sudan (FPOL-1)
2) Afghanistan/Pakistan (FPOL-1)
3) Somalia (FPOL-1)
4) Iran (FPOL-1)
5) North Korea (FPOL-1)
B. Key Continuing Issues
1) UN Security Council Reform (FPOL-1)
2) Iraq (FPOL-1)
3) Middle East Peace Process (FPOL-1)
4) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC-3)
5) UN Humanitarian and Complex Emergency Response
(HREL-3)
6) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMDN-5H)
7) Terrorist Threat to UN Operations (TERR-5H)
8) Burma (FPOL-1)
C. UN Peace and Peacebuilding Operations
1) Africa (FPOL-1)
2) Outside Africa (FPOL-1)
3) Policy Issues (FPOL-1)
D. UN Security Council
1) Procedures and Dynamics (FPOL-1)
2) Sanctions (FPOL-1)
E. UN Management
1) UN Leadership Dynamics (FPOL-1)
2) Budget and Management Reform (FPOL-1)
F. UN General Assembly Tactics and Voting Blocs (FPOL-1)
G. Other Substantive Issues
1) Food Security (FOOD-3)
2) Climate Change, Energy, and Environment (ENVR-4)
3) Transnational Economic Issues (ECFS-4H)
4) Arms Control and Treaty Monitoring (ACTM-4)
5) Health Issues (HLTH-4)
6) Terrorism (TERR-5H)
7) Trafficking, Social, and Women's Issues (DEPS-5H)
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H. Intelligence and Security Topics
1) GRPO can provide text of this issue.
2) GRPO can provide text of this issue.
3) Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations (FPOL-1)
4) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information
Systems (INFR-5H)
15. Collection requirements and tasking
(Agriculture is the Department of Agriculture; Commerce is
the Department of Commerce; DHS is the Department of Homeland
Security; DIA/DH is Defense Intelligence Agency/Defense
HUMINT; Energy is the Department of Energy; DNI/OSC is the
Open Source Center of the Director of National Intelligence;
FBI is the Federal Bureau of Investigation; HHS is the
Department of Health and Human Services; Navy is the Navy
HUMINT element; NCS/CS is the CIA's Clandestine Service;
OSC/MSC is the Map Services Center of OSC; State is the
Department of State; TAREX (Target Exploitation) collects
information using HUMINT Methods in support of NSA's
requirements; Treasury is the Department of Treasury; USAID
is the U.S. Agency for International Development; USSS is the
U.S. Secret Service; USTR is the U.S. Trade Representative;
WINPAC is the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and
Arms Control Center.)
A. Key Near-Term Issues
1) Darfur/Sudan (FPOL-1).
-- Views of United Nations (UN) member states on contributing
troops and air transportation equipment, such as helicopters,
to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the African Union
(AU)-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).
-- Details of deployments of troop contributor countries to
UNMIS/UNAMID.
-- Details on actions and views of UN personnel deployed in
UNMIS/UNAMID.
-- Views of UNSC members on the success or failure of
UNMIS/UNAMID.
-- Operational plans of UNMIS/UNAMID from both the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York, and
UNMIS/UNAMID in Sudan.
-- Details of diplomatic engagement between UNMIS/UNAMID
Special Envoys for the Darfur Peace Process in Sudan, and the
Sudanese government or Darfur rebel groups.
-- Views of member states on UN activities in Sudan
(including Darfur).
-- Divisions between UN member and UN Secretariat assessments
of the situation on the ground as it affects UN action.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya,
Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Rwanda, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda,
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Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, European Union (EU), UN
2) Afghanistan/Pakistan (FPOL-1).
-- Plans and intentions of key UN leaders and member states
regarding the ongoing operations of the UN Assistance Mission
in Afghanistan (UNAMA), including force protection in
Afghanistan.
-- Information on plans and intentions of UN leadership or
member states affecting elections in Afghanistan.
-- Reactions to and assessments of security threats directed
at the UN or aid personnel attempting to render humanitarian
assistance.
-- Plans and intentions of key member states and Secretariat
leadership concerning Afghan political and economic
reconstruction, including efforts to combat warlords and drug
trafficking.
-- Afghan, Pakistani and Iranian intentions or reluctance to
secure and safeguard UN and nongovernmental organization
(NGO) personnel (international as well as locally-hired
staff).
Countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa
Rica, Croatia, France, Iran, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Pakistan,
Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
Terrorist Groups: Taliban
International Organizations: EU, UN, World Bank
3) Somalia (FPOL-1).
-- UN plans and potential to expand, reinforce, or replace
the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and African Union
(AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
-- Plans and intentions of UN leadership, the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, and member states to deploy a UN-led
maritime force to monitor piracy off the coast of Somalia.
-- Willingness of member states to pledge troops or air
transport to a possible UN or multinational force in Somalia.
-- Views of Somali population on the deployment of a UN or
multinational peacekeeping force in Somalia.
-- Details of diplomatic engagement between UN envoys and
Somali government or Somali opposition officials.
-- Information on World Food Program activities in Somalia.
-- Details of UN Development Program (UNDP)-Somalia training
Transitional Federal Government police officers and Alliance
for the Reliberation of Somalia officials in the Joint
Security Force.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, China, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico,
Russia, Somalia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, NATO, UN
4) Iran (FPOL-1).
-- Plans and intentions of the UN Secretary General (SYG),
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Secretariat staff, or member states to address efforts by
Iran to develop, test, or proliferate nuclear weapons.
-- Positions and responses of member states to future
International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) Director
General reports on Iran,s Implementation of Safeguards and
relevant provisions of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.
-- Specific plans and activities of the UK, France, Germany
(EU-3), and Russia with respect to IAEA policy toward Iran.
-- Plans and intentions of key UN leaders and member states,
especially Russia and China, regarding human rights in Iran,
sanctions on Iran, Iran,s arming of HAMAS and Hizballah, and
Iran,s candidacy for UN leadership positions.
-- Plans and intentions of Perm 5, other key member states,
coalition partners, and key Secretariat officials concerning
sanctions against Iran.
-- Member support/opposition/subversion of US positions
regarding Iranian sanctions.
-- Iranian diplomatic efforts with the IAEA and UN member
states to avoid passage of additional sanctions and effective
implementation of existing sanctions, as well as its efforts
to end UNSC involvement in Iran's nuclear program by
returning Iran's nuclear file to the IAEA.
-- Information on Iran,s activities as chair of the UNDP and
within the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
-- Development and democratization activities of the UNDP in
Iran; details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s
relationship with Iranian officials.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Libya,
Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
Terrorist Groups: HAMAS, Hizballah (Lebanese)
International Organizations: EU, IAEA, UN
Non-State Entities: West Bank and Gaza Strip
5) North Korea (FPOL-1).
-- Plans and intentions of UNSC members, especially the P-5,
to consider additional resolutions against North Korea and/or
sanctions under existing resolutions.
-- Information on the plans and actions of UNSC members to
address efforts by North Korea to develop, test, or
proliferate nuclear weapons.
-- UN views on food aid to North Korea, designating it as a
nation in famine, and misuse of aid.
-- North Korean delegation views and activities;
instructions/plans of delegation officials on North Korean
WMD-related issues.
-- Development and democratization activities of the UNDP in
North Korea.
-- Details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s
relationship with North Korean officials.
-- Biographic and biometric information on ranking North
Korean diplomats.
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Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Russia,
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, IAEA, UN
B. Key Continuing Issues
1) UN Security Council Reform (FPOL-1).
-- Positions, attitudes, and divisions among member states on
UN Security Council (UNSC) reform.
-- Views, plans and intentions of Perm 5 and other member
states on the issue of UNSC enlargement, revision of UNSC
procedures or limitation of Perm 5 privileges.
-- International deliberations regarding UNSC expansion among
key groups of countries: self-appointed frontrunners for
permanent UNSC membership Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan
(the Group of Four or G-4); the Uniting for Consensus group
(especially Mexico, Italy, and Pakistan) that opposes
additional permanent UNSC seats; the African Group; and the
EU, as well as key UN officials within the Secretariat and
the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Presidency.
-- Willingness of member states to implement proposed reforms.
-- Reactions of UN senior leadership towards member
recommendations for UNSC reform.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Libya, Mexico,
Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, UN
2) Iraq (FPOL-1).
-- Plans and intentions of the Perm 5, other key member
states, coalition partners, and key Secretariat officials
concerning Iraqi political and economic reconstruction, the
UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), and internal Iraqi
boundaries.
-- Plans and intentions of the International Organization for
Migration to assist with the reintegration of internally
displaced persons and refugees.
-- Extent to which member states will support or subvert US
positions regarding Iraqi objectives, including
reconstruction efforts.
-- Information on plans and intentions of the SYG,
Secretariat staff, or member states affecting elections in
Iraq.
-- Iraqi actions to convert UNAMI to a Chapter 6 mission.
-- Iraqi attitudes toward the UN.
-- Reactions to and assessments of security threats directed
at the UN or aid personnel attempting to render humanitarian
assistance.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Iraq, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
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Terrorist Groups: Insurgents in Iraq, Iraqi Shia Militants
International Organizations: EU, UN, World Bank
3) Middle East Peace Process (FPOL-1).
-- Details on views, plans and intentions of key Secretariat
decision-makers, member states and influential blocs and
coalitions on UN engagement and role in the Middle East Peace
Process (MEPP), including implementation of the roadmap.
-- Indications that a UNGA special session on the Middle East
might be reconvened.
-- Developments within the UN system that would further the
Arab-Israeli peace process.
-- Details about Quartet (EU, UN, US, and Russia) MEPP plans
and efforts, including private objectives behind proposals
and envoy negotiating strategies.
-- Strategy and plans of SYG special envoy regarding US
positions, Quartet plans, and other (EU, Russia, UK) special
envoys.
-- Indications member states or donor countries might scale
back UN peacekeeping presence in or aid donations to the
Middle East.
-- Plans of the SYG or member states to pressure the US on
the MEPP.
-- Views, plans and tactics of the Palestinian Authority,
including its representative to the UN, to gain support in
the UNSC, UNGA, or UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) for its
strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli issues,
including from Russia and EU countries, especially France,
Germany, and UK.
-- Views of Secretary General,s Special Envoy and UNSC on
possible settlement of the Shab'a Farms dispute to include
Syria/Lebanon border demarcation.
-- Secretariat views regarding water management as part of
the Middle East Peace Process, including domestic and
regional competition for allocation.
-- Quartet views on Syria's policies and approach toward
Israel and Palestinians and on Syrian motives behind and
efforts to subvert or support Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations.
-- UN efforts to influence negotiating positions on
territorial boundaries, water resources and management, and
right of return.
-- Views, plans and tactics of HAMAS to gain support in the
UNSC or UNGA for its strategies and positions on
HAMAS-Israeli issues, and on HAMAS-Palestinian Authority
issues, including from Russia, China, Iran, and EU countries,
especially France, Germany, and the UK.
-- Information on UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)
activities in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the West
Bank, and its relations with HAMAS/Hizballah.
-- Plans and intentions of member states to support/oppose US
priority to reduce the number of Middle East resolutions.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
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Croatia, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Spain, Syria, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
Terrorist Groups: HAMAS, Hizballah (Lebanese)
International Organizations: EU, UN
Non-State Entities: Palestinian Authority, West Bank and
Gaza Strip
4) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC-3).
-- Plans and policies of UN leaders, member states, and
foreign NGOs to promote human rights.
-- Plans and intentions of member states toward the
International Criminal Court (ICC), International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and other
UN-related courts and tribunals dealing with human rights
issues.
-- Plans and intentions of UNHRC members to support or oppose
US policies in the UNHRC.
-- Views of UNSC and other member states on Zimbabwe,s
government policies on human rights, humanitarian assistance,
democracy, and candidacy for any UN leadership positions.
-- Views and intentions of UNSC, UN human rights entities,
and members regarding Sri Lankan government policies on human
rights and humanitarian assistance; UN views about
appointing a Special Envoy for Sri Lanka.
-- Plans and perceptions of member states toward
establishment of new measures to prevent genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and other systematic human
rights abuses.
-- Plans and intentions of member states toward proposals and
resolutions supported by the US or like-minded states,
including those advancing democracy; women's rights,
particularly implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1325 and
1820; those pertaining to children in armed conflict; or
those condemning human rights abuses in individual countries.
-- Information on reactions of member states to resolutions
designed to promote democracy, human rights and reforms in
the Muslim world.
-- Perceived success or failure of abilities and priorities
of the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights
(OHCHR), and efforts by member states to undermine OHCHR
independence.
-- Views, intentions and tactics of UNHRC members regarding
reform and the role of the US.
-- Member state support for/opposition to objectives of human
rights, refugee, development, and emergency relief agencies.
-- Plans and intentions of member states or UN Special
Rapporteurs to press for resolutions or investigations into
US counterterrorism strategies and treatment of detainees in
Iraq, Afghanistan or Guantanamo.
-- Degree of coordination by and among human rights agencies,
especially between the UN Human Rights Council, the OHCHR,
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the UNGA Third Committee, the UN Economic and Social Council,
and the International Labor Organization.
-- Plans and agenda for upcoming UNGA Third Committee and
UNHRC sessions and world human rights conferences,
particularly plans by developing countries to stymie
criticism of their human rights records through procedural
motions or influencing votes.
-- Plans of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to
sponsor resolutions or conventions in the UN restricting
freedom of speech under the rubric of criminalizing
"defamation of religion."
-- Details of UNHRC and OHCHR budget shortfalls.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Chad, China, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Georgia, Iraq, Japan, Lebanon,
Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe
International Organizations: AU, EU, Human Rights Entities
and War Crimes Courts, ICC, OIC, UN
5) UN Humanitarian and Complex Emergency Response
(HREL-3).
-- Information on the planning and execution of responses to
humanitarian emergencies by UN member states and Secretariat;
indications US assistance may be requested.
-- Efforts of UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
World Food Program (WFP), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN
Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO),
and other UN entities to respond to and to coordinate
activities in humanitarian or refugee crises, including
environmental disasters.
-- Views of UN Secretariat, UNSC members, and key member
states on UNRWA.
-- Details on effectiveness of UNHCR and OCHA leadership.
-- Information on ability of UN to gain/not gain humanitarian
access to troubled areas, especially in light of security
concerns.
-- Location of humanitarian facilities, including GPS
coordinates, and number of personnel.
-- Details of friction between UNHCR, OCHA and UN Security
Coordinator Headquarters and field offices.
-- Level of cooperation and coordination or lack thereof
between UN aid agencies and non-UN aid programs.
-- Interoperability and willingness to work with US
coalitions in humanitarian assistance operations; willingness
to provide support despite security threats.
-- Indications of donor fatigue.
-- Status of and member support for/opposition to efforts by
UNHCR to refocus organization's work and to redistribute
programs to other agencies.
-- Details on UNHCR funding shortfalls.
-- Perceived ability of the UNDP to coordinate an effective
UN presence in each country and to promote democratic
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governance.
-- Plans and ability to care for and protect internally
displaced persons.
-- Communications and logistics problems.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: Economic-Societal Entities,
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN, World Health
Organization
6) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMDN-5H).
-- Plans and intentions of member states to address threats
to international security from the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.
-- Views of member states on tactical and substantive aspects
of resolutions pertaining to missile proliferation, missile
defense, nuclear disarmament, the IAEA, and Israel's nuclear
program.
-- Information from key Secretariat decision-makers, key IAEA
Secretariat staff, member states, or influential blocs or
groups, such as the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), the OIC, or
the Group of 77 (G-77), on the role of the UN on nuclear
proliferation or addressing the expansion of capabilities to
produce or use weapons of mass destruction.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, IAEA, International Arms
Control Organizations, OIC, UN
7) Terrorist Threat to UN Operations (TERR-5H).
-- Plans and intentions of Secretariat and member states to
respond to individuals affiliated with terrorist groups or
state sponsors of terrorism threatening the safety or
security of domestic and overseas UN personnel, facilities,
protectees, or installations.
-- Evidence of relationship or funding between UN personnel
and/or missions and terrorist organizations.
-- Debate in Secretariat, UNSC counterterrorism bodies
(subcommittees), UN agencies and among member states about
measures for funding of security for UN domestic and overseas
facilities, operations, and personnel.
-- Host-country intentions to secure and safeguard UN and NGO
personnel.
-- Reactions to and assessments of terrorist acts directed at
the UN, UN personnel, UN protectees, or domestic and overseas
UN installations, including foreign UN missions in New York.
-- Details of UN efforts to acquire, collect, assess and
disseminate threat information within the US and overseas.
-- Plans of UN security offices to upgrade security at UN
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domestic and overseas UN facilities.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: UN
8) Burma (FPOL-1).
-- Views of UNSC and member states on Burma,s policies and
actions on human rights, humanitarian assistance, democracy,
and attempts to play a larger UN role.
-- Plans and intentions of the Special Adviser to the UN
Secretary General on Burma regarding future interaction with
Burma and engagement with UN member states.
-- Plans and intentions of the SYG on Burma; level of trust
in his Special Adviser.
-- Views of Burmese officials on the SYG, on his Special
Adviser on Burma, and on key countries in the UN.
-- Role of the UN in Burmese elections.
-- Development and democratization activities of UNDP in
Burma; details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s
relationship with Burmese officials.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia,
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, UN
C. UN Peace and Peacebuilding Operations.
1) Africa (FPOL-1).
-- Plans and intentions of UN leaders and member states
regarding peace operations, especially in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Chad/Central African
Republic, Burundi, Cote d,Ivoire, and Liberia.
-- UN peacekeeping plans and intentions regarding military
operations against rebels based in the eastern part of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
-- Early warning information available to the Secretariat on
potential threats to peace and security.
-- UN views on the role of AFRICOM in African conflict
resolution and post-conflict capacity building.
-- UN expectations of US military involvement in African
peacekeeping missions and how this may influence UN
willingness to establish, curb, or end missions.
-- Extent to which UN peace operations in Africa are
straining the resources of the UN and member states; impact
of current operations on future operations and readiness.
-- UN views on peacekeeping mission creep and pressures to
expand the UN role in African conflict zones, either in the
form of more comprehensive "peacemaking" mission mandates or
in areas where security threats demand more aggressive and
timely UN-led multilateral intervention.
-- Details on views of the UN Department of Peacekeeping
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Operations on operational plans, including the ability of the
UN and its member states to build capacity in Africa,
including by working with the AU or other regional
organizations and NGOs.
-- Efforts by China, France, Iran, and others to gain
influence in Africa via UN peace operations.
-- Information on extent of support and capabilities for
peace operations by the AU and the Economic Community of
Western African States (ECOWAS).
-- Official stance on deploying HIV positive troops and
actual practice.
-- Degree to which official peacekeeping reporting matches
unofficial communications of events; views on those
discrepancies.
-- Views of African states that host peacekeepers regarding
UN peacekeeping troops and troop contributing countries.
-- Attitudes and intentions of Ghana and Rwanda concerning UN
peace operations in Africa and perception of their relative
ability to contribute to such efforts.
-- Attitudes of other African States to Ghana/Rwanda
participation and leadership.
Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Central African Republic, Chad, China, Congo, Cote d,Ivoire,
Democratic Republic, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia,
France, India, Japan, Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Nepal,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa,
Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zimbabwe
International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN
Non-State Entities: Lord,s Resistance Army
2) Outside Africa (FPOL-1).
-- Plans and intentions of UN leaders and member states
regarding ongoing peace operations outside Africa.
-- Willingness of UN leaders and member states to support UN
peacekeeping efforts and utilize preventive diplomacy in
areas of potential conflict.
-- Views of member states on and plans to respond to the
US-backed G-8 plan to expand global peace operations
capabilities.
-- Views and positions of key member states and Secretariat
toward proposed resolutions, mandates, peacekeeping issues,
and US-sponsored initiatives.
-- Information on whether member states will utilize
references to the ICC to condition support for peace
operations.
-- Information on deployment benchmarks, pre-deployment
screening, and supply and logistic shortfalls in peace
operations.
-- Ability to obtain pledges and deploy capable military
forces, including surge capabilities.
-- Views of UNSC members, the Secretariat, and key member
states on Haiti,s government policies and actions on human
rights, humanitarian assistance, and democracy.
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-- Views and positions of UNSC members, the Secretariat, and
key member states regarding the UN Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) and peacekeeping in Lebanon.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Georgia, Haiti, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,
Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Uganda,
Uruguay, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN
3) Policy Issues (FPOL-1).
-- UN member views, plans, and intentions concerning the
capability of the UN to organize, lead, and carry out new,
complex military operations and civilian police operations.
-- Information on Secretariat or member views on or
initiatives for peace operations reform.
-- Information on the appointment of SYG special
representatives for new peace or political operations.
-- Scope, objectives, command structures, rules of
engagement, and threat environment for proposed peacekeeping
activities, including transportation and communications
infrastructures and any available maps.
-- Types, number, and capabilities of troops, equipment, and
materiel that countries are willing to contribute.
-- Information on interoperability of equipment and material
available for logistic support.
-- Information on turf battles between the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, and
Department of Political Affairs over control of peace
operations.
-- Information on turf battles between logistic and military
sides of peace operations.
-- UN member views on reform of the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations.
-- Information on troop contributing countries' tendency to
follow orders given by troop contributing country commanders
vice UN field commanders.
-- Influence of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) and the Office of the High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNCHR) on including human rights and refugee
concerns within peace operations mandates.
-- Host government views and concerns about UN policies
toward that country.
-- Influence of UN security coordinator on operational
planning; field personnel reaction to UN security directives.
-- Capability/plans for Standby High-Readiness Brigade
(SHIRBRIG) deployments.
-- Details on peacekeeper abuse of women and children;
national and UN responses.
-- Changes in ability of member states, especially member
states of EU, AU and ECOWAS, to contribute troops to peace
operations, including for economic, social, and operational
reasons.
-- Details on contributions of member states (in kind,
STATE 00080163 014 OF 024
personnel, or financial).
Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, China, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, India, Italy, Japan,
Jordan, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia,
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda,
Uruguay, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, UN
D. UN Security Council
1) Procedures and Dynamics (FPOL-1).
-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC members and
Secretariat on issues that come before the UNSC, especially
voting intentions of UNSC members and priorities or frictions
among the Perm 5.
-- Plans and intentions of UNSC members to support or oppose
US policies in the UNSC.
-- Specific views and positions of key member states on
US-sponsored initiatives, initiatives with implications for
the US, and other proposed resolutions and mandates.
-- Plans, intentions, views, positions, lobbying, and tactics
of regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the
UNSC, especially those that do not include the US
(particularly the Africa Group, AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group,
Arab League, the OIC, and the Group of Latin America and
Caribbean Countries (GRULAC).
-- Differences in the positions of member states, differences
between UN missions and their capitals, internal procedures
for determining voting instructions, and voting instructions
to delegations.
-- Priorities, plans, and intentions of new member states
joining the UNSC, and influences on them by regional groups,
blocs, or coalitions on issues before the UNSC, especially
those that do not include the US (particularly AU, EU, NAM,
G-77, Rio Group, Arab League, and the OIC).
-- Plans and intentions of member states of regional groups
regarding UNSC candidacy.
-- Biographic and biometric information on UNSC Permanent
Representatives, information on their relationships with
their capitals.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, OIC, UN
2) Sanctions (FPOL-1).
-- UNSC member plans, intentions, and views toward sanctions
issues, especially during negotiations of sanctions
resolutions.
-- Willingness of and efforts by UN member states to violate
sanctions.
-- Perceived and actual impact of sanctions on target
STATE 00080163 015 OF 024
governments, individuals, entities, as well as on civil
population.
-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC sanctions committee
members.
-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC sanctions committee
expert groups and their ability to support sanctions
monitoring.
-- Pressure to limit scope and length of new sanctions,
especially from coalitions and regional groups.
-- Views and actions of the Secretariat or member states with
regard to sanctions, including to bolster UN ability to
support sanctions implementation and to address violations.
-- Views of target government on sanctions imposed on it.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Sierra Leone,
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, UN
E. UN Management
1) UN Leadership Dynamics (FPOL-1).
-- SYG's management and decision-making style, and his
influence on the Secretariat.
-- Plans, measures and efforts undertaken by the SYG and
subordinates on US political and bureaucratic objectives for
UN management.
-- Role and influence of Secretariat and other key officials
with SYG and other UN system agencies.
-- Views of and brokering by key officials on major issues.
-- Changes in and appointment and selection process for key
officials of Secretariat, specialized agency, committee,
commission, and program officials in New York, Geneva,
Vienna, and other UN system cities, to include special
assistants and chiefs of staff.
-- Personalities, biographic and biometric information,
roles, effectiveness, management styles, and influence of key
UN officials, to include under secretaries, heads of
specialized agencies and their chief advisers, top SYG aides,
heads of peace operations and political field missions,
including force commanders.
-- Relations between key UN officials and member states.
-- Views of member states on the next SYG race, to include
preferred candidates and candidates lacking UN member support.
-- Views of UNSC members and other member states on Cuban,
Iranian, or Syrian candidacy for any UN leadership positions.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cuba, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Syria,
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: UN
2) Budget and Management Reform (FPOL-1).
-- Plans, measures and efforts undertaken by the SYG and
STATE 00080163 016 OF 024
subordinates on US political and bureaucratic objectives for
UN management.
-- Perceptions of member states of the effectiveness of the
Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the Joint
Inspection Unit (JIU) to combat waste, fraud, mismanagement,
and corruption.
-- Effectiveness of the OIOS, in light of the review of the
OIOS mandate.
-- Plans and moves to implement OIOS recommendations.
-- SYG's view of the role of the OIOS.
-- Secretariat attitudes toward and evidence of corruption in
UN agencies and programs, and willingness to implement
measures to reduce corruption.
-- Plans and intentions of UN member states or the
Secretariat to address corruption issues at the UN and UN
agencies.
-- Plans and intentions of UNDP Executive Board members to
push for or block management reform proposals.
-- Plans and intentions of UNDP Executive Board members or
senior UNDP managers to address potential or actual cases of
corruption or mismanagement by field missions, including
efforts to cover up waste, fraud, or abuse.
-- Internal complaints by UNDP staff about waste, fraud, or
abuse and efforts by UNDP management to respond to them.
-- Plans and intentions of Board members, such as Iran, to
push for increased UNDP funding for programs in their own
countries or those of their friends.
-- Degree of independence from UN headquarters of UNDP
Resident Coordinators in the field and perceptions of field
staff on UN aid consolidation reforms under the "One UN"
Program.
-- Efforts by the G-77 Board members to develop common group
platforms, especially on budget and management reform issues.
-- Developments in the implementation of the performance
based personnel system and contractor reform.
-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UN specialized agency
executive committees.
-- Impact and effectiveness of whistle-blowing provisions on
the UN reform process.
-- Attitudes of UN staff and member states towards extending
a common whistle-blower protection program to all UN funds
and programs.
-- Indications of pressure by member states or groups to
increase or control growth in the budget.
-- Secretariat and member attitudes towards changes in the
scale of assessments.
-- Options under consideration to resolve financial problems.
-- SYG views on and plans for responding to Government
Accountability Office reports calling on the UN to more
effectively implement results-based budgeting, and make
further progress on management reform.
-- Secretariat and member attitudes and plans to improve the
UN budget process.
-- Status and use of advanced information systems to
STATE 00080163 017 OF 024
streamline UN processes.
Countries: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China,
Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Japan, Libya,
Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: UN
F. UN General Assembly Tactics and Voting Blocs (FPOL-1).
-- Plans, intentions, views, positions, lobbying, and tactics
of regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the
General Assembly, especially those that do not include the
US, i.e., the Africa Group, AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group,
Arab League, the OIC, and the GRULAC.
-- Details of bargaining on votes or candidacies and attempts
to marginalize or undermine proposed or planned US positions
or policy initiatives.
-- Information on the EU agenda in the UNGA, especially as it
relates to US priorities in the First, Third, and Fifth
Committees.
-- Information on efforts by the EU or other member states to
secure additional voting rights in the UN and its specialized
agencies.
-- Lobbying by member states for committee membership
assignments or vice presidencies.
-- Information on current and likely future leadership of
regional groups, blocs, and coalitions.
-- Differences over positions between UN missions and their
respective capitals.
-- Voting instructions to delegations on key resolutions.
-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of key committee chairs;
member views of issues that come before these committees.
-- Efforts of Third World countries to moderate, via NAM and
G-77, Third World positions on development, defamation of
religion, or human rights issues.
-- Intentions of UN members to use non-UN bodies and working
groups to bypass perceived UN bureaucracy.
-- Perceptions of member states of the viability and
potential impact of the US-backed Democracy Caucus.
-- Biographical and biometric information on key NAM/G-77/OIC
Permanent Representatives, particularly China, Cuba, Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan,
Uganda, Senegal, and Syria; information on their
relationships with their capitals.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya,
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Senegal, South Africa,
Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, OIC, UN
G. Other Substantive Issues
1) Food Security (FOOD-3).
-- Status and proposals related to the UN Comprehensive
STATE 00080163 018 OF 024
Framework for Action to address the global food crisis.
-- WFP activities and proposals related to reforming donor
food aid policies and establishing a new standing global fund
to address regularly occurring food crises.
-- WFP and FAO plans and proposals regarding the impact on
food prices and food security of the growing use of ethanol
and biofuels.
-- Internal UN responses to international calls for reform of
FAO and WFP.
Countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Haiti, Iraq, Japan, Libya,
Mexico, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, Sudan,
Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe
International Organizations: FAO, UN, World Animal Health
Organization
Non-State Entities: Palestinian Authority, West Bank and
Gaza Strip
2) Climate Change, Energy, and Environment (ENVR-4).
-- Country preparations for the December 2009 Copenhagen UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Meeting.
-- Developments related to other UNFCCC meetings and
discussions on a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol.
-- Perceptions of key negotiators on US positions in
environmental negotiations.
-- Developments on the Montreal Protocol, including reactions
to US efforts to limit hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs).
-- Indications that member states working through the UN and
its specialized agencies are/are not fostering environmental
cooperation, partnerships and capacity building between and
among member states and regional and sub-regional
organizations.
-- Monitoring of and compliance with UN-sponsored
environmental treaties; evidence of treaty circumvention.
-- Information on adherence to member states' own national
environmental programs, including protection, monitoring, and
cleanup efforts.
-- Efforts by treaty secretariats to influence treaty
negotiations or compliance.
-- Information on the Convention on Biological Diversity,
particularly on access, benefit sharing and bio-safety.
-- Information on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,
including potential efforts to modify or amend its provisions.
-- Information on excessive maritime claims, including those
relating to ridges.
-- Information on efforts to develop a mechanism to add
chemicals to the list of persistent organic pollutants.
-- Information and perceptions on the strategic approach to
international chemicals management, especially efforts of the
EU's management program.
-- Information on participation in and compliance with the UN
Basel Convention.
-- Status of efforts to set standards to promote
STATE 00080163 019 OF 024
environmental protection, including protection of forests,
desertification, and invasive or endangered species.
-- Efforts within the UN to protect water resources, and to
promote development of alternative sources of energy.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, UN
3) Transnational Economic Issues (ECFS-4H).
-- Information on efforts by UN member states or
organizations to promote or obstruct regulatory reform,
including banking and financial reforms, transparency,
international law, trade, development, and foreign direct
investment to reflect the Monterrey anti-poverty consensus
and the Millennium Development Goals.
-- Plans, intentions, and tactics of the UNGA President
regarding international financial problems; views of member
states regarding these plans.
-- Plans and intentions of member states to support US
priorities related to economic freedom and promotion of
democracy.
-- Secretariat or member plans to develop multilateral
economic, trade, or development agreements impinging on US
interests.
-- Efforts by member states and the Secretariat to reconcile
international differences over globalization, especially the
perceived impact of globalization on human rights, labor, and
environmental issues.
-- Member positions on UN decisions, plans, and activities
concerning environmentally sustainable economic growth
through market economies, free trade, private investment, and
efficient multilateral development assistance.
-- Efforts to expand the global compact involving
corporations committed to observing human rights,
environmental, and labor standards.
-- SYG's views and statements on trade issues and efforts to
influence future World Trade Organization rounds.
-- Plans and intentions of UN member states that may impact
freedom of navigation.
-- Information on international taxation initiatives.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, FAO, International
Financial Institutions and Infrastructures, UN, World Bank,
World Trade Organization
4) Arms Control and Treaty Monitoring (ACTM-4).
-- Plans, tactics, timetables, and draft proposals for the
Eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and especially
STATE 00080163 020 OF 024
information related to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East
and a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone initiative, from
interested individual member states (especially China, Cuba,
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, and South Africa) and
like-minded groups such as the NAM and the New Agenda
Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South
Africa, and Sweden).
-- Member state views of the major problems facing the NPT;
whether or under what conditions states would consider
withdrawing from the NPT.
-- Member views on and responses to US plans and policies on
missile defense and positions on a Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty, particularly those of Russia, China, and Pakistan.
-- Information on IAEA plans for safeguards, international
fuel banks, or other nuclear fuel supply arrangements, and
meetings of the Board of Governors at the IAEA.
-- Member views on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT); prospects for country ratifications and entry into
force.
-- Member plans for plenary meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group; views of the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Initiative.
-- Readiness of member states to reform the agenda of the UN
General Assembly's First Committee; proposals prepared by
member states for the First Committee.
-- Views of key delegations on US proposals on land mines.
-- Tactical and substantive information regarding periodic
arms control meetings in New York, Geneva, Vienna and
elsewhere, including the Biological Weapons Convention, the
Chemical Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) review process, UN experts group on missiles,
and meetings on conventional arms.
-- Plans and intentions of member states to introduce new
arms control or proliferation prevention measures or make
significant changes to existing agreements.
- Member or Secretariat plans to address WMD proliferation,
safeguards, arms control and disarmament, or other threat
reduction efforts.
-- Foreign attitudes on UN-sanctioned arms control
negotiations.
-- Biographic and biometric data on, and positions of key UN
arms control interlocutors, especially candidates for the
position of Director General of the IAEA, and the heads of
other international institutions.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland,
Japan, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, South
Africa, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, IAEA, International Arms
Control Organizations, NATO, OSCE, UN
5) Health Issues (HLTH-4).
-- UN, WHO, and other international organizations,
STATE 00080163 021 OF 024
forecasts, expected impacts, plans, proposals, key studies,
and reactions to major health crises and other health-related
issues, including efforts on disease eradication, improving
health standards and access to care and medicine, and
programs to monitor and respond to emerging infectious
disease outbreaks and other disasters or emergencies.
-- Information on deliberations in the UN and other
international health organizations on health issues and the
policy positions and objectives of member states and key
figures, including compromises, insertions, and items omitted
in published declarations and studies.
-- Information on international health organizations,
relationships and interactions with countries and other
organizations, including relationships with regional offices
or subsidiaries.
-- Details on limits and restrictions placed on international
organizations to investigate reports of diseases that pose an
international threat, including restrictions placed on the
nationality of members of investigation teams.
-- Details on disease transparency, particularly indications
about inconsistent reporting of outbreaks to appropriate
international organizations and delivery of specimens to WHO-
and FAO-affiliated laboratories, and including discussions or
agreements impacting the publicly disclosed occurrence of
diseases.
-- Details of discussions related to the accessibility of
HIV/AIDS drugs (antiretroviral drugs or ARVs).
-- Details related to the availability, accessibility, and
regulation of health care, particularly medications,
vaccines, and counterfeits.
-- Member state attitudes toward maintenance of smallpox
stocks.
-- Information on global counterfeit medications to include
surveillance, countermeasures, and research and development
issues.
-- Details on efforts to implement health-related Millennium
Development Goals.
-- Details on corruption in international health
organizations or the corrupt use of goods and services
provided for health issues by bilateral and multilateral
donors and international health organizations, including WHO,
UNAIDS, FAO, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis,
and Malaria.
-- Details on irregularities in Global Fund fundraising,
spending, and treatment of whistle blowers.
-- Personalities, biographic and biometric information,
roles, effectiveness, management styles, and influence of key
health officials, to include the Director General of the WHO,
head of UNAIDS, the Pan American Health Organization, under
Secretaries, heads of specialized agencies and their chief
advisers, and top aides.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
STATE 00080163 022 OF 024
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, FAO, UN, World Animal Health
Organization, WHO
6) Terrorism (TERR-5H).
-- Information on plans and intentions of UN bodies and
member states to respond to or address within UN fora the
worldwide terrorist threat.
-- Structure, plans and key figures of UN counterterrorism
strategy.
-- Information on plans and activities of UNSC,s four
counterterrorism sub-bodies.
-- Plans and intentions of member states to address terrorism
by implementing anti-terrorism legislation as called for
under resolutions, particularly as they relate to tracking
financial transactions.
-- Views of member states on US policy toward terrorism.
-- Efforts of member states to support or oppose activities
undertaken by UN specialized agencies such as the
International Maritime Organization and the International
Civil Aviation Organization to improve maritime and airline
security.
-- Information on UN support for technical assistance to
member states to combat terrorism, particularly in Africa.
-- Views of member states about inclusion or exclusion of
terrorism against Israel in counterterrorism efforts and
definition of terrorism.
-- (For further requirements, see the NHCD on Terrorism
Threats to US Interests at Home and Abroad, July 13, 2005.)
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: UN
7) Trafficking, Social, and Women's Issues (DEPS-5H).
-- Plans and intentions of member states to support or oppose
US priority to combat trafficking and exploitation of men,
women, and children.
-- Member state perceptions of ability of UN Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) to follow through on strategies to
support women and children through UN specialized bodies.
-- Information on member efforts to combat organized crime,
narcotics trafficking, and trafficking in persons.
-- Plans and intentions of member states to address
reproductive issues, including the aims of the EU vis-a-vis
the US, GRULAC, Arab, and OIC nations.
-- Member state perceptions or plans regarding efforts to
reconcile religious differences worldwide.
-- Information on reforms undertaken within the UN
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
and future plans of the organization.
-- Member views on education initiatives.
STATE 00080163 023 OF 024
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, OIC, UN
H. Intelligence and Security Topics
1) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related
requirements.
2) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related
requirements.
3) Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations (FPOL-1).
-- Influence of key UN-affiliated foreign NGOs on UN
decision-making.
-- Efforts of foreign NGOs to undermine US policy initiatives.
-- Foreign NGO role in, views toward, and influence on UN
policies and activities on globalization, justice, human
rights, the environment, and
family/women/children/reproductive issues.
-- Ability and capacity of foreign NGOs to assist refugees,
displaced persons, and victims of disasters through the UNHCR
and WFP.
-- Ability and capacity of foreign NGOs to support the UN
Environmental Program or national efforts with environmental
protection, pollution monitoring, and cleanup efforts.
-- Contacts between foreign NGOs and Secretariat staff that
could involve sharing of confidential data.
-- Foreign efforts to strip US or foreign NGOs of UN
affiliation and to block US or foreign NGOs seeking UN
affiliation.
-- Efforts by member states-*particularly China, Cuba,
Israel, Russia, and Islamic countries*-to obtain NGO
affiliation for organizations supporting their policies.
-- Efforts by organizations affiliated with terrorist
organizations or foreign intelligence organizations to obtain
NGO affiliation with the UN.
-- Efforts by the EU through the Arhus convention to place
NGOs on UN bureaus; reactions of member states to those
efforts.
-- Role of NGOs at the Office of the High Commissioner for
Refugees (OHCR), OHCHR, and UNHRC in the Third Committee of
the UNGA.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cuba, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, OIC, UN
4) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information
Systems (INFR-5H).
-- Current technical specifications, physical layout, and
planned upgrades to telecommunications infrastructure and
STATE 00080163 024 OF 024
information systems, networks, and technologies used by top
officials and their support staffs.
-- Details on commercial and private VIP networks used for
official communications, to include upgrades, security
measures, passwords, personal encryption keys, and types of V
P N versions used.
-- Telephone numbers and e-mail addresses of key officials,
as well as limited distribution telephone numbers/directories
and public switched networks (PSTN) telephone directories;
dialing numbers for voice, datalink, video teleconferencing,
wireless communications systems, cellular systems, personal
communications systems, and wireless facsimiles.
-- Information on hacking or other security incidents
involving UN networks.
-- Key personnel and functions of UN entity that maintains UN
communications and computer networks.
-- Indications of IO/IW operations directed against the UN.
-- Information about current and future use of communications
systems and technologies by officials or organizations,
including cellular phone networks, mobile satellite phones,
very small aperture terminals (VSAT), trunked and mobile
radios, pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls, encryption,
international connectivity, use of electronic data
interchange, Voice-over-Internet protocol (VoIP), Worldwide
interoperability for microwave access (Wi-Max), and cable and
fiber networks.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: UN
CLINTON

Destination

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RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 8889
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9893
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 8737
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RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 8154
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHI-1B/CLM//DP//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//NHTC//




Summary
A directive to American diplomats last year laid out the many ways in which they could collect information

to pass on to the intelligence agencies, including foreign associates’ credit card and frequent

flyer numbers that could be used to track a person’s movements.

ኦሽንoc
Leader
Leader
Posts: 1129
Joined: 07 Aug 2009 14:20
Contact:

Re: Wikileaks and American Embassy leaked documents on Egypt

Unread post by ኦሽንoc » 30 Nov 2010 00:34

Monday, 09 February 2009, 16:10
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 000231
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
EO 12958 DECL: 02/09/2019
TAGS PREL, KPAL, EG, IS, QA, IR, SY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR REQUESTED EGYPTIAN FM ABOUL GHEIT
MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

-------
Summary
-------
1. (S/NF) Madame Secretary, Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit has been looking forward to meeting you since your nomination was first announced. The Egyptian leadership, including President Mubarak, are encouraged by the Administration's immediate attention to the Middle East and your and the President's early outreach to them. Overall, the Egyptians believe they did not receive fair treatment from the previous Administration and hope to see improvements. Aboul Gheit likely will explain Egypt's "soft power"--its ability to influence regional events without benefit of deep pockets. He likely will focus more on the strategic challenges of the region--the peace process and Iran--but may also address some pending bilateral matters. He may ask for your support for Egypt to be part of an expanded G8 or G20 and press the candidacy of Egyptian Culture Minister Farouq Hosny for Director General of UNESCO. He may not raise human rights (specifically Ayman Nour), political reform, or democratization; but you should. Aboul Gheit will want to discuss Gaza, including smuggling and counter-tunneling; Iran; and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. On Iraq and counter-terrorism, we and the Egyptians see largely eye-to-eye; intelligence cooperation is close and effective; and our military-to-military relationship is durable but stuck in a force-on-force mindset.
2. (S/NF) Summary continued: Aboul Gheit is smart, urbane, with a tendency to lecture and to avoid discussing Egyptian failings with all-purpose recourse to Egyptian sovereign pride. However, because this is his first meeting with you and it is in Washington, he may be more inclined to listen. You should thank him for Egypt's continuing regional leadership, in particular regarding their efforts to bring about a ceasefire in Gaza, and press him for Egypt to continue to use their influence and good offices to achieve a permanent solution to intra-Palestinian infighting and conflict. You should also stress the need for Egypt to more effectively insure that Hamas cannot rearm via smuggling across -- or tunneling under -- the border with Gaza. Aboul Gheit will press for your attendance at the March 2 Gaza Donors Conference in Cairo, and may complain about unhelpful Qatari and Syrian behavior. He will also want to explore US intentions towards Iran; President Mubarak told Senator Mitchell during his recent visit here that he did not oppose our talking with the Iranians, as long as "you don't believe a word they say." End summary.
------------------------
Respect and Appreciation
------------------------
3. (S/NF) In terms of regional affairs, Special Middle East Envoy Senator George Mitchell struck the right chord during his recent visit to Cairo when he told President Mubarak that he was here to "listen and hear your advice." The Egyptians have long felt that, at best, we take them for granted; and at worst, we deliberately ignore their advice while trying to force our point of view on them. You may wish to thank Aboul Gheit for the vital role Egypt played in bringing about a ceasefire in Gaza, and its efforts at making it last. You should ask him what the current state of play is between Hamas and Fatah and have him describe Egypt's vision of the future for the Palestinians, both among their factions, and vis a vis Israel. Note: Although the Egyptians will react well to overtures of respect and appreciation, Egypt is very often a stubborn and recalcitrant ally. In addition, Egypt's self-perception as the "indispensable Arab state" is contingent on Egyptian effectiveness on regional issues, including Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq.
-----------------------------------------
Egypt and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict
-----------------------------------------
4. (S/NF) Although Aboul Gheit was never enthusiastic about the Annapolis Peace process, resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the primary strategic political goal for the Egyptians. They are proud of their role as intermediary, well aware that they are perhaps the only player that can talk with us, the Israelis, and all Palestinian factions. Mubarak hates Hamas, and considers them the same as Egypt's own Muslim Brotherhood, which he sees as his own most dangerous political threat. Since the
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June 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza, the Egyptians, under the leadership of intelligence chief Omar Soliman (the de facto national security advisor with direct responsibility for the Israeli-Palestinian account) have shifted their focus to intra-Palestinian reconciliation and establishment of the Hamas-Israel ceasefire. Soliman brokered a half-year-long truce last year, which Hamas broke in December, leading to the Israeli invasion of Gaza. He has recently re-started those efforts, with the goal of getting Hamas to agree to a year-long ceasefire, which should give the Egyptians space to bring about their political goal of Palestinian reconciliation under a technocratic, non-partisan government headed by President Mahmoud Abbas.
----------------
Gaza and Tunnels
----------------
5. (S/NF) Smuggling through the Sinai Peninsula and into Gaza is an old and complicated problem for Egypt. Egypt views a well-armed and powerful Hamas as a national security threat, a point driven home in dramatic fashion by the January 2008 border breach when Hamas bulldozed the old border fence and more than half a million Palestinians poured into Egypt, unchecked and hungry. Since the closure of the Egypt-Gaza border following the June 2007 Gaza takeover by Hamas, most smuggling of consumer goods and weapons has gone underground. The narrow corridor between Egypt and Gaza is as honey-combed with subterranean passageways as a gigantic ant colony.
6. (S/NF) Although it is not directly in Aboul Gheit's bailiwick, belonging more to the security and intelligence forces, nonetheless the issue of tunnels and rearming Hamas is the subject of intense scrutiny (by Israel and the Congress), and sensitivity (by the Egyptians). Long criticized by Israel for "not doing enough" to halt arms smuggling via tunnels, the Egyptians have stopped complaining and started acting. Egypt has increased efforts to counter arms smuggling by accelerating its $23 million FMF-funded tunnel detection program along the Egypt-Gaza border and requesting U.S. support to purchase four backscatter X-Ray machines to scan vehicles entering the Sinai for weapons and explosives (note Aboul Ghait may not be of this EGIS-originated request). Egypt also continues to cooperate with Israel, especially via intelligence sharing, to prevent militants from Hamas and other extremist organizations from crossing the Gaza border, and on thwarting militant activity in Egypt. Egyptian efforts are all justified under President Mubarak's pledge that Egypt with "protect its borders."
7. (S/NF) Egypt will not take any action that could be perceived as collaboration in Israel's siege of Gaza, and they have been hyper-sensitive to any suggestion that foreigners are assisting them or overseeing their efforts to counter smuggling. Aboul Gheit publicly distanced Egypt from our January MOU with Israel to combat arms smuggling into Gaza, although he knew about it in advance and consulted with Secretary Rice and me about its contents. The Egyptians do not want to be stuck holding the Gaza bag, and must be able to point the finger of blame at Israel for the plight of the Palestinians. At the same time, Egypt has withstood scathing and widespread criticism in the Arab world for refusing to open the Rafah border crossing to supply Gaza. Even during the height of the December fighting, the Egyptians only sent medicine and medical supplies through the Rafah border; all other humanitarian goods went through the Israeli crossing at Kerem Shalom. They likewise insist that Rafah will only reopen to handle Gazan travellers when the Gazan side is under PA control with EU observers according to the 2005 AMA.
8. (S/NF) Ultimately, Egypt believes that the only realistic and viable solution to erode Hamas' power and stop arms smuggling is the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza and the opening of Gaza's border to legitimate trade. While in the short term we can best assist the Egyptians with technical know-how and training, long term counter smuggling success will depend on reducing the financial incentives to smuggling by providing the Sinai Bedouin with legitimate economic opportunities and by regularly opening the Gaza borders to trade, thereby reducing economic incentives to smuggle.
----------------------------------
The March 2 Gaza Donors Conference
----------------------------------
9. (S/NF) President Mubarak told Senator Mitchell that he
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wanted to personally invite you to the March 2 Gaza Donors Conference in Cairo. Aboul Gheit will press hard for you to accept this invitation. He is keen to keep up the momentum on Gaza reconstruction and for Egypt to be seen as taking the lead in helping the Palestinians. It is very important to him that this conference be at the ministerial level, and he will be disappointed if you are unable to accept.
-------------
Iraq and Iran
-------------
10. (S/NF) President Mubarak enjoys recounting for visiting members of Congress how he warned former President Bush against invading Iraq, ending with, "I told you so!" and a wag of his finger. In addition, there are Egyptian misgivings about Nuri Al-Maliki and Shia majority rule in Iraq. Egypt therefore will need additional prodding to continue to take steps to help rehabilitate Iraq into the greater Arab world. You should ask Aboul Gheit when he plans to fully open the Egyptian embassy in Baghdad and exchange accredited ambassadors with Iraq (the first Egyptian ambassador to post-Saddam Iraq was assassinated). As for Iran, Mubarak has a visceral hatred for the Islamic Republic, referring repeatedly to Iranians as "liars," and denouncing them for seeking to destabilize Egypt and the region. He sees the Syrians and Qataris as sycophants to Tehran and liars themselves. There is no doubt that Egypt sees Iran and its greatest long-term threat, both as it develops a nuclear capability and as it seeks to export its "Shia revolution." Nonetheless, Mubarak told Mitchell pointedly that he did not oppose the U.S. speaking to the Iranians, as long as we did not "believe a single word they say." Aboul Gheit will be keen to hear your description of U.S. intentions towards Iran. In his conversation with Senator Mitchell, Aboul Gheit carefully noting he was speaking personally, expressed more interest into bringing the Syrians into negotiations again; President Mubarak was not enthusiastic about dealing with the Syrians at this time.
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U.S. Assistance to Egypt
------------------------
11. (S/NF) The greatest Egyptian outrage a year ago -- Congressional conditioning of $100 million of U.S. assistance to Egypt -- may now be moot, according to our latest understanding of the state of play with the FY2009 appropriations language. Beyond the issue of conditioning, the Egyptians resent the U.S. unilateral decision to cut ESF in half, from $415 million in FY-08 to $200 million in FY-09, a level which the Egyptians find embarrassing, not because they need the money (they say), but because it shows our diminished view of the value of our relationship. In my view, it is important to the U.S. to continue an ESF program aimed at health, education, and poverty eradication to demonstrate concern for the Egyptian people as opposed to a strictly military assistance program. Egypt has also been unhappy with the use of these funds to support democracy in Egypt. It would be useful if you could urge that Egypt accept the FY 2009 levels so that we can proceed to program funds to benefit Egypt, while promising to engage in a serious review of the conflicts that exist and a desire to resolve them as soon as possible.
12. (S/NF) Concerning military assistance, the Egyptian political and military leadership feel that they have been "short changed" by our holding to an FMF level of $1.3 billion, (the same level for 30 years despite inflation), and which they contrast with increases to our military assistance to Israel. Finally, Egypt seeks a higher profile in international financial circles (Finance Minister Youssef Boutros Ghali was recently named Chairman of the IMF's policy-setting committee, the IMFC, the first from a developing country), and Aboul Gheit is likely to ask for your support to include Egypt in expanded G8 and G20 fora.
---------------------------------
Ayman Nour and Saad Eddin Ibrahim
---------------------------------
13. (S/NF) Egypt's political leadership considers our public chastisement of their treatment of jailed former opposition Al Ghad party leader Ayman Nour as interfering with internal affairs and infringement on national sovereignty. Mubarak takes this issue personally, and it makes him seethe when we raise it, particularly in public. Aboul Gheit's view is that we have made Ayman Nour a freedom martyr, and a damaging (and
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distorting) prism through which we view our relationship with Egypt. Much the same can be said about Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the outspoken political science professor and democracy activist who is in self-imposed exile in the U.S. because of spurious law suits brought against him for allegedly defaming Egypt. In a negative development in late January, Egypt,s Attorney General-equivalent took action to advance the only criminal case pending against Ibrahim. You should press Aboul Gheit hard on Nour and Ibrahim, and also urge the GOE to stop arresting other less prominent political activists. Nour's health is bad and he has served more than half his sentence; he deserves a humanitarian pardon. You may wish to lay down a marker for a future discussion on democratization and human rights concerns. You might note that although you and the President want to improve the relationship, Egypt could take some steps to remove these very volatile issues from the agenda.
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Farouq Hosny
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13. (S/NF) Egypt has mounted a full-scale international campaign to support the candidacy of Culture Minister Farouq Hosny for Director General of UNESCO. The Arab League and the African Union have already publicly stated their commitment to Hosny, and the Egyptians believe they also have the support of several Europeans, notably the French. Aboul Gheit will also seek US support -- or, at least, not to actively oppose -- the candidacy of Farouq Hosny as the next Director General of UNESCO. The U.S. informed him last year that we could not support the candidacy and urged Egypt to put forward another name. Abould Gheit will argue Hosny's merits for facing down the Islamic extremists who want to narrow the space in Egypt for artistic expression. U.S. objections have been to statements Hosny has made that "Israel had no culture. . .it stole cultural ideas from others and claimed them as its own" and other objectionable remarks. If we plan to derail the Hosny candidacy, we must provide a credible alternate, preferably an Arab and/or Muslim. SCOBEY

ኦሽንoc
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Re: Wikileaks and American Embassy leaked documents on UN

Unread post by ኦሽንoc » 30 Nov 2010 02:02

Friday, 31 July 2009, 20:24
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 24 STATE 080163
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/31/2034
TAGS PINR, KSPR, ECON, KPKO, KUNR
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: THE UNITED
NATIONS
REF: STATE 048489
Classified By: MICHAEL OWENS, ACTING DIR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).

1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on the United Nations (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued DOS reporting of biographic information relating to the United Nations (paragraph 2).
A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the 2004 NHCD and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs focused on the United Nations. The review produced a comprehensive list of strategic priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on the United Nations. The priorities should also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).
B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.
C. (S/NF) Important information often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review of this National HUMINT Collection Directive. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels.
2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting:
A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community's collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC.
B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible when they have information relating to persons linked to : office and
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organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.
3. (S/NF) Priority issues and issues outline:
A. Key Near-Term Issues 1) Darfur/Sudan (FPOL-1) 2) Afghanistan/Pakistan (FPOL-1) 3) Somalia (FPOL-1) 4) Iran (FPOL-1) 5) North Korea (FPOL-1)
B. Key Continuing Issues 1) UN Security Council Reform (FPOL-1) 2) Iraq (FPOL-1) 3) Middle East Peace Process (FPOL-1) 4) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC-3) 5) UN Humanitarian and Complex Emergency Response (HREL-3) 6) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDN-5H) 7) Terrorist Threat to UN Operations (TERR-5H) 8) Burma (FPOL-1)
C. UN Peace and Peacebuilding Operations 1) Africa (FPOL-1) 2) Outside Africa (FPOL-1) 3) Policy Issues (FPOL-1)
D. UN Security Council 1) Procedures and Dynamics (FPOL-1) 2) Sanctions (FPOL-1)
E. UN Management 1) UN Leadership Dynamics (FPOL-1) 2) Budget and Management Reform (FPOL-1)
F. UN General Assembly Tactics and Voting Blocs (FPOL-1)
G. Other Substantive Issues 1) Food Security (FOOD-3) 2) Climate Change, Energy, and Environment (ENVR-4) 3) Transnational Economic Issues (ECFS-4H) 4) Arms Control and Treaty Monitoring (ACTM-4) 5) Health Issues (HLTH-4) 6) Terrorism (TERR-5H) 7) Trafficking, Social, and Women's Issues (DEPS-5H)
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H. Intelligence and Security Topics 1) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 2) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 3) Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations (FPOL-1) 4) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H)
15. Collection requirements and tasking
(Agriculture is the Department of Agriculture; Commerce is the Department of Commerce; DHS is the Department of Homeland Security; DIA/DH is Defense Intelligence Agency/Defense HUMINT; Energy is the Department of Energy; DNI/OSC is the Open Source Center of the Director of National Intelligence; FBI is the Federal Bureau of Investigation; HHS is the Department of Health and Human Services; Navy is the Navy HUMINT element; NCS/CS is the CIA's Clandestine Service; OSC/MSC is the Map Services Center of OSC; State is the Department of State; TAREX (Target Exploitation) collects information using HUMINT Methods in support of NSA's requirements; Treasury is the Department of Treasury; USAID is the U.S. Agency for International Development; USSS is the U.S. Secret Service; USTR is the U.S. Trade Representative; WINPAC is the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center.)
A. Key Near-Term Issues
1) Darfur/Sudan (FPOL-1). -- Views of United Nations (UN) member states on contributing troops and air transportation equipment, such as helicopters, to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the African Union (AU)-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). -- Details of deployments of troop contributor countries to UNMIS/UNAMID. -- Details on actions and views of UN personnel deployed in UNMIS/UNAMID. -- Views of UNSC members on the success or failure of UNMIS/UNAMID. -- Operational plans of UNMIS/UNAMID from both the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York, and UNMIS/UNAMID in Sudan. -- Details of diplomatic engagement between UNMIS/UNAMID Special Envoys for the Darfur Peace Process in Sudan, and the Sudanese government or Darfur rebel groups. -- Views of member states on UN activities in Sudan (including Darfur). -- Divisions between UN member and UN Secretariat assessments of the situation on the ground as it affects UN action.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Rwanda, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda,
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Vietnam International Organizations: AU, European Union (EU), UN
2) Afghanistan/Pakistan (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of key UN leaders and member states regarding the ongoing operations of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), including force protection in Afghanistan. -- Information on plans and intentions of UN leadership or member states affecting elections in Afghanistan. -- Reactions to and assessments of security threats directed at the UN or aid personnel attempting to render humanitarian assistance. -- Plans and intentions of key member states and Secretariat leadership concerning Afghan political and economic reconstruction, including efforts to combat warlords and drug trafficking. -- Afghan, Pakistani and Iranian intentions or reluctance to secure and safeguard UN and nongovernmental organization (NGO) personnel (international as well as locally-hired staff).
Countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Iran, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam Terrorist Groups: Taliban International Organizations: EU, UN, World Bank
3) Somalia (FPOL-1). -- UN plans and potential to expand, reinforce, or replace the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). -- Plans and intentions of UN leadership, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and member states to deploy a UN-led maritime force to monitor piracy off the coast of Somalia. -- Willingness of member states to pledge troops or air transport to a possible UN or multinational force in Somalia. -- Views of Somali population on the deployment of a UN or multinational peacekeeping force in Somalia. -- Details of diplomatic engagement between UN envoys and Somali government or Somali opposition officials. -- Information on World Food Program activities in Somalia. -- Details of UN Development Program (UNDP)-Somalia training Transitional Federal Government police officers and Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia officials in the Joint Security Force.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Somalia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, NATO, UN
4) Iran (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of the UN Secretary General (SYG),
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Secretariat staff, or member states to address efforts by Iran to develop, test, or proliferate nuclear weapons. -- Positions and responses of member states to future International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) Director General reports on Iran,s Implementation of Safeguards and relevant provisions of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. -- Specific plans and activities of the UK, France, Germany (EU-3), and Russia with respect to IAEA policy toward Iran. -- Plans and intentions of key UN leaders and member states, especially Russia and China, regarding human rights in Iran, sanctions on Iran, Iran,s arming of HAMAS and Hizballah, and Iran,s candidacy for UN leadership positions. -- Plans and intentions of Perm 5, other key member states, coalition partners, and key Secretariat officials concerning sanctions against Iran. -- Member support/opposition/subversion of US positions regarding Iranian sanctions. -- Iranian diplomatic efforts with the IAEA and UN member states to avoid passage of additional sanctions and effective implementation of existing sanctions, as well as its efforts to end UNSC involvement in Iran's nuclear program by returning Iran's nuclear file to the IAEA. -- Information on Iran,s activities as chair of the UNDP and within the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). -- Development and democratization activities of the UNDP in Iran; details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s relationship with Iranian officials.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam Terrorist Groups: HAMAS, Hizballah (Lebanese) International Organizations: EU, IAEA, UN Non-State Entities: West Bank and Gaza Strip
5) North Korea (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of UNSC members, especially the P-5, to consider additional resolutions against North Korea and/or sanctions under existing resolutions. -- Information on the plans and actions of UNSC members to address efforts by North Korea to develop, test, or proliferate nuclear weapons. -- UN views on food aid to North Korea, designating it as a nation in famine, and misuse of aid. -- North Korean delegation views and activities; instructions/plans of delegation officials on North Korean WMD-related issues. -- Development and democratization activities of the UNDP in North Korea. -- Details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s relationship with North Korean officials. -- Biographic and biometric information on ranking North Korean diplomats.
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Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, IAEA, UN
B. Key Continuing Issues
1) UN Security Council Reform (FPOL-1). -- Positions, attitudes, and divisions among member states on UN Security Council (UNSC) reform. -- Views, plans and intentions of Perm 5 and other member states on the issue of UNSC enlargement, revision of UNSC procedures or limitation of Perm 5 privileges. -- International deliberations regarding UNSC expansion among key groups of countries: self-appointed frontrunners for permanent UNSC membership Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan (the Group of Four or G-4); the Uniting for Consensus group (especially Mexico, Italy, and Pakistan) that opposes additional permanent UNSC seats; the African Group; and the EU, as well as key UN officials within the Secretariat and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Presidency. -- Willingness of member states to implement proposed reforms. -- Reactions of UN senior leadership towards member recommendations for UNSC reform.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, UN
2) Iraq (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of the Perm 5, other key member states, coalition partners, and key Secretariat officials concerning Iraqi political and economic reconstruction, the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), and internal Iraqi boundaries. -- Plans and intentions of the International Organization for Migration to assist with the reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees. -- Extent to which member states will support or subvert US positions regarding Iraqi objectives, including reconstruction efforts. -- Information on plans and intentions of the SYG, Secretariat staff, or member states affecting elections in Iraq. -- Iraqi actions to convert UNAMI to a Chapter 6 mission. -- Iraqi attitudes toward the UN. -- Reactions to and assessments of security threats directed at the UN or aid personnel attempting to render humanitarian assistance.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Iraq, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
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Terrorist Groups: Insurgents in Iraq, Iraqi Shia Militants International Organizations: EU, UN, World Bank
3) Middle East Peace Process (FPOL-1). -- Details on views, plans and intentions of key Secretariat decision-makers, member states and influential blocs and coalitions on UN engagement and role in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), including implementation of the roadmap. -- Indications that a UNGA special session on the Middle East might be reconvened. -- Developments within the UN system that would further the Arab-Israeli peace process. -- Details about Quartet (EU, UN, US, and Russia) MEPP plans and efforts, including private objectives behind proposals and envoy negotiating strategies. -- Strategy and plans of SYG special envoy regarding US positions, Quartet plans, and other (EU, Russia, UK) special envoys. -- Indications member states or donor countries might scale back UN peacekeeping presence in or aid donations to the Middle East. -- Plans of the SYG or member states to pressure the US on the MEPP. -- Views, plans and tactics of the Palestinian Authority, including its representative to the UN, to gain support in the UNSC, UNGA, or UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) for its strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli issues, including from Russia and EU countries, especially France, Germany, and UK. -- Views of Secretary General,s Special Envoy and UNSC on possible settlement of the Shab'a Farms dispute to include Syria/Lebanon border demarcation. -- Secretariat views regarding water management as part of the Middle East Peace Process, including domestic and regional competition for allocation. -- Quartet views on Syria's policies and approach toward Israel and Palestinians and on Syrian motives behind and efforts to subvert or support Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. -- UN efforts to influence negotiating positions on territorial boundaries, water resources and management, and right of return. -- Views, plans and tactics of HAMAS to gain support in the UNSC or UNGA for its strategies and positions on HAMAS-Israeli issues, and on HAMAS-Palestinian Authority issues, including from Russia, China, Iran, and EU countries, especially France, Germany, and the UK. -- Information on UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) activities in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank, and its relations with HAMAS/Hizballah. -- Plans and intentions of member states to support/oppose US priority to reduce the number of Middle East resolutions.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
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Croatia, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Spain, Syria, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam Terrorist Groups: HAMAS, Hizballah (Lebanese) International Organizations: EU, UN Non-State Entities: Palestinian Authority, West Bank and Gaza Strip
4) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC-3). -- Plans and policies of UN leaders, member states, and foreign NGOs to promote human rights. -- Plans and intentions of member states toward the International Criminal Court (ICC), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and other UN-related courts and tribunals dealing with human rights issues. -- Plans and intentions of UNHRC members to support or oppose US policies in the UNHRC. -- Views of UNSC and other member states on Zimbabwe,s government policies on human rights, humanitarian assistance, democracy, and candidacy for any UN leadership positions. -- Views and intentions of UNSC, UN human rights entities, and members regarding Sri Lankan government policies on human rights and humanitarian assistance; UN views about appointing a Special Envoy for Sri Lanka. -- Plans and perceptions of member states toward establishment of new measures to prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other systematic human rights abuses. -- Plans and intentions of member states toward proposals and resolutions supported by the US or like-minded states, including those advancing democracy; women's rights, particularly implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1325 and 1820; those pertaining to children in armed conflict; or those condemning human rights abuses in individual countries. -- Information on reactions of member states to resolutions designed to promote democracy, human rights and reforms in the Muslim world. -- Perceived success or failure of abilities and priorities of the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), and efforts by member states to undermine OHCHR independence. -- Views, intentions and tactics of UNHRC members regarding reform and the role of the US. -- Member state support for/opposition to objectives of human rights, refugee, development, and emergency relief agencies. -- Plans and intentions of member states or UN Special Rapporteurs to press for resolutions or investigations into US counterterrorism strategies and treatment of detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan or Guantanamo. -- Degree of coordination by and among human rights agencies, especially between the UN Human Rights Council, the OHCHR,
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the UNGA Third Committee, the UN Economic and Social Council, and the International Labor Organization. -- Plans and agenda for upcoming UNGA Third Committee and UNHRC sessions and world human rights conferences, particularly plans by developing countries to stymie criticism of their human rights records through procedural motions or influencing votes. -- Plans of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to sponsor resolutions or conventions in the UN restricting freedom of speech under the rubric of criminalizing "defamation of religion." -- Details of UNHRC and OHCHR budget shortfalls.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Chad, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Georgia, Iraq, Japan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe International Organizations: AU, EU, Human Rights Entities and War Crimes Courts, ICC, OIC, UN
5) UN Humanitarian and Complex Emergency Response (HREL-3). -- Information on the planning and execution of responses to humanitarian emergencies by UN member states and Secretariat; indications US assistance may be requested. -- Efforts of UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), World Food Program (WFP), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), and other UN entities to respond to and to coordinate activities in humanitarian or refugee crises, including environmental disasters. -- Views of UN Secretariat, UNSC members, and key member states on UNRWA. -- Details on effectiveness of UNHCR and OCHA leadership. -- Information on ability of UN to gain/not gain humanitarian access to troubled areas, especially in light of security concerns. -- Location of humanitarian facilities, including GPS coordinates, and number of personnel. -- Details of friction between UNHCR, OCHA and UN Security Coordinator Headquarters and field offices. -- Level of cooperation and coordination or lack thereof between UN aid agencies and non-UN aid programs. -- Interoperability and willingness to work with US coalitions in humanitarian assistance operations; willingness to provide support despite security threats. -- Indications of donor fatigue. -- Status of and member support for/opposition to efforts by UNHCR to refocus organization's work and to redistribute programs to other agencies. -- Details on UNHCR funding shortfalls. -- Perceived ability of the UNDP to coordinate an effective UN presence in each country and to promote democratic
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governance. -- Plans and ability to care for and protect internally displaced persons. -- Communications and logistics problems.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: Economic-Societal Entities, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN, World Health Organization
6) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDN-5H). -- Plans and intentions of member states to address threats to international security from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. -- Views of member states on tactical and substantive aspects of resolutions pertaining to missile proliferation, missile defense, nuclear disarmament, the IAEA, and Israel's nuclear program. -- Information from key Secretariat decision-makers, key IAEA Secretariat staff, member states, or influential blocs or groups, such as the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), the OIC, or the Group of 77 (G-77), on the role of the UN on nuclear proliferation or addressing the expansion of capabilities to produce or use weapons of mass destruction.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, IAEA, International Arms Control Organizations, OIC, UN
7) Terrorist Threat to UN Operations (TERR-5H). -- Plans and intentions of Secretariat and member states to respond to individuals affiliated with terrorist groups or state sponsors of terrorism threatening the safety or security of domestic and overseas UN personnel, facilities, protectees, or installations. -- Evidence of relationship or funding between UN personnel and/or missions and terrorist organizations. -- Debate in Secretariat, UNSC counterterrorism bodies (subcommittees), UN agencies and among member states about measures for funding of security for UN domestic and overseas facilities, operations, and personnel. -- Host-country intentions to secure and safeguard UN and NGO personnel. -- Reactions to and assessments of terrorist acts directed at the UN, UN personnel, UN protectees, or domestic and overseas UN installations, including foreign UN missions in New York. -- Details of UN efforts to acquire, collect, assess and disseminate threat information within the US and overseas. -- Plans of UN security offices to upgrade security at UN
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domestic and overseas UN facilities.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN
8) Burma (FPOL-1). -- Views of UNSC and member states on Burma,s policies and actions on human rights, humanitarian assistance, democracy, and attempts to play a larger UN role. -- Plans and intentions of the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General on Burma regarding future interaction with Burma and engagement with UN member states. -- Plans and intentions of the SYG on Burma; level of trust in his Special Adviser. -- Views of Burmese officials on the SYG, on his Special Adviser on Burma, and on key countries in the UN. -- Role of the UN in Burmese elections. -- Development and democratization activities of UNDP in Burma; details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s relationship with Burmese officials.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, UN
C. UN Peace and Peacebuilding Operations.
1) Africa (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of UN leaders and member states regarding peace operations, especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Chad/Central African Republic, Burundi, Cote d,Ivoire, and Liberia. -- UN peacekeeping plans and intentions regarding military operations against rebels based in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. -- Early warning information available to the Secretariat on potential threats to peace and security. -- UN views on the role of AFRICOM in African conflict resolution and post-conflict capacity building. -- UN expectations of US military involvement in African peacekeeping missions and how this may influence UN willingness to establish, curb, or end missions. -- Extent to which UN peace operations in Africa are straining the resources of the UN and member states; impact of current operations on future operations and readiness. -- UN views on peacekeeping mission creep and pressures to expand the UN role in African conflict zones, either in the form of more comprehensive "peacemaking" mission mandates or in areas where security threats demand more aggressive and timely UN-led multilateral intervention. -- Details on views of the UN Department of Peacekeeping
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Operations on operational plans, including the ability of the UN and its member states to build capacity in Africa, including by working with the AU or other regional organizations and NGOs. -- Efforts by China, France, Iran, and others to gain influence in Africa via UN peace operations. -- Information on extent of support and capabilities for peace operations by the AU and the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS). -- Official stance on deploying HIV positive troops and actual practice. -- Degree to which official peacekeeping reporting matches unofficial communications of events; views on those discrepancies. -- Views of African states that host peacekeepers regarding UN peacekeeping troops and troop contributing countries. -- Attitudes and intentions of Ghana and Rwanda concerning UN peace operations in Africa and perception of their relative ability to contribute to such efforts. -- Attitudes of other African States to Ghana/Rwanda participation and leadership.
Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Congo, Cote d,Ivoire, Democratic Republic, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, India, Japan, Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zimbabwe International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN Non-State Entities: Lord,s Resistance Army
2) Outside Africa (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of UN leaders and member states regarding ongoing peace operations outside Africa. -- Willingness of UN leaders and member states to support UN peacekeeping efforts and utilize preventive diplomacy in areas of potential conflict. -- Views of member states on and plans to respond to the US-backed G-8 plan to expand global peace operations capabilities. -- Views and positions of key member states and Secretariat toward proposed resolutions, mandates, peacekeeping issues, and US-sponsored initiatives. -- Information on whether member states will utilize references to the ICC to condition support for peace operations. -- Information on deployment benchmarks, pre-deployment screening, and supply and logistic shortfalls in peace operations. -- Ability to obtain pledges and deploy capable military forces, including surge capabilities. -- Views of UNSC members, the Secretariat, and key member states on Haiti,s government policies and actions on human rights, humanitarian assistance, and democracy.
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-- Views and positions of UNSC members, the Secretariat, and key member states regarding the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and peacekeeping in Lebanon.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Georgia, Haiti, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN
3) Policy Issues (FPOL-1). -- UN member views, plans, and intentions concerning the capability of the UN to organize, lead, and carry out new, complex military operations and civilian police operations. -- Information on Secretariat or member views on or initiatives for peace operations reform. -- Information on the appointment of SYG special representatives for new peace or political operations. -- Scope, objectives, command structures, rules of engagement, and threat environment for proposed peacekeeping activities, including transportation and communications infrastructures and any available maps. -- Types, number, and capabilities of troops, equipment, and materiel that countries are willing to contribute. -- Information on interoperability of equipment and material available for logistic support. -- Information on turf battles between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, and Department of Political Affairs over control of peace operations. -- Information on turf battles between logistic and military sides of peace operations. -- UN member views on reform of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. -- Information on troop contributing countries' tendency to follow orders given by troop contributing country commanders vice UN field commanders. -- Influence of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) on including human rights and refugee concerns within peace operations mandates. -- Host government views and concerns about UN policies toward that country. -- Influence of UN security coordinator on operational planning; field personnel reaction to UN security directives. -- Capability/plans for Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) deployments. -- Details on peacekeeper abuse of women and children; national and UN responses. -- Changes in ability of member states, especially member states of EU, AU and ECOWAS, to contribute troops to peace operations, including for economic, social, and operational reasons. -- Details on contributions of member states (in kind,
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personnel, or financial).
Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, India, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, UN
D. UN Security Council
1) Procedures and Dynamics (FPOL-1). -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC members and Secretariat on issues that come before the UNSC, especially voting intentions of UNSC members and priorities or frictions among the Perm 5. -- Plans and intentions of UNSC members to support or oppose US policies in the UNSC. -- Specific views and positions of key member states on US-sponsored initiatives, initiatives with implications for the US, and other proposed resolutions and mandates. -- Plans, intentions, views, positions, lobbying, and tactics of regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the UNSC, especially those that do not include the US (particularly the Africa Group, AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group, Arab League, the OIC, and the Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC). -- Differences in the positions of member states, differences between UN missions and their capitals, internal procedures for determining voting instructions, and voting instructions to delegations. -- Priorities, plans, and intentions of new member states joining the UNSC, and influences on them by regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the UNSC, especially those that do not include the US (particularly AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group, Arab League, and the OIC). -- Plans and intentions of member states of regional groups regarding UNSC candidacy. -- Biographic and biometric information on UNSC Permanent Representatives, information on their relationships with their capitals.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, OIC, UN
2) Sanctions (FPOL-1). -- UNSC member plans, intentions, and views toward sanctions issues, especially during negotiations of sanctions resolutions. -- Willingness of and efforts by UN member states to violate sanctions. -- Perceived and actual impact of sanctions on target
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governments, individuals, entities, as well as on civil population. -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC sanctions committee members. -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC sanctions committee expert groups and their ability to support sanctions monitoring. -- Pressure to limit scope and length of new sanctions, especially from coalitions and regional groups. -- Views and actions of the Secretariat or member states with regard to sanctions, including to bolster UN ability to support sanctions implementation and to address violations. -- Views of target government on sanctions imposed on it.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Sierra Leone, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, UN
E. UN Management
1) UN Leadership Dynamics (FPOL-1). -- SYG's management and decision-making style, and his influence on the Secretariat. -- Plans, measures and efforts undertaken by the SYG and subordinates on US political and bureaucratic objectives for UN management. -- Role and influence of Secretariat and other key officials with SYG and other UN system agencies. -- Views of and brokering by key officials on major issues. -- Changes in and appointment and selection process for key officials of Secretariat, specialized agency, committee, commission, and program officials in New York, Geneva, Vienna, and other UN system cities, to include special assistants and chiefs of staff. -- Personalities, biographic and biometric information, roles, effectiveness, management styles, and influence of key UN officials, to include under secretaries, heads of specialized agencies and their chief advisers, top SYG aides, heads of peace operations and political field missions, including force commanders. -- Relations between key UN officials and member states. -- Views of member states on the next SYG race, to include preferred candidates and candidates lacking UN member support. -- Views of UNSC members and other member states on Cuban, Iranian, or Syrian candidacy for any UN leadership positions.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN
2) Budget and Management Reform (FPOL-1). -- Plans, measures and efforts undertaken by the SYG and
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subordinates on US political and bureaucratic objectives for UN management. -- Perceptions of member states of the effectiveness of the Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) to combat waste, fraud, mismanagement, and corruption. -- Effectiveness of the OIOS, in light of the review of the OIOS mandate. -- Plans and moves to implement OIOS recommendations. -- SYG's view of the role of the OIOS. -- Secretariat attitudes toward and evidence of corruption in UN agencies and programs, and willingness to implement measures to reduce corruption. -- Plans and intentions of UN member states or the Secretariat to address corruption issues at the UN and UN agencies. -- Plans and intentions of UNDP Executive Board members to push for or block management reform proposals. -- Plans and intentions of UNDP Executive Board members or senior UNDP managers to address potential or actual cases of corruption or mismanagement by field missions, including efforts to cover up waste, fraud, or abuse. -- Internal complaints by UNDP staff about waste, fraud, or abuse and efforts by UNDP management to respond to them. -- Plans and intentions of Board members, such as Iran, to push for increased UNDP funding for programs in their own countries or those of their friends. -- Degree of independence from UN headquarters of UNDP Resident Coordinators in the field and perceptions of field staff on UN aid consolidation reforms under the "One UN" Program. -- Efforts by the G-77 Board members to develop common group platforms, especially on budget and management reform issues. -- Developments in the implementation of the performance based personnel system and contractor reform. -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UN specialized agency executive committees. -- Impact and effectiveness of whistle-blowing provisions on the UN reform process. -- Attitudes of UN staff and member states towards extending a common whistle-blower protection program to all UN funds and programs. -- Indications of pressure by member states or groups to increase or control growth in the budget. -- Secretariat and member attitudes towards changes in the scale of assessments. -- Options under consideration to resolve financial problems. -- SYG views on and plans for responding to Government Accountability Office reports calling on the UN to more effectively implement results-based budgeting, and make further progress on management reform. -- Secretariat and member attitudes and plans to improve the UN budget process. -- Status and use of advanced information systems to
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streamline UN processes.
Countries: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN
F. UN General Assembly Tactics and Voting Blocs (FPOL-1). -- Plans, intentions, views, positions, lobbying, and tactics of regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the General Assembly, especially those that do not include the US, i.e., the Africa Group, AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group, Arab League, the OIC, and the GRULAC. -- Details of bargaining on votes or candidacies and attempts to marginalize or undermine proposed or planned US positions or policy initiatives. -- Information on the EU agenda in the UNGA, especially as it relates to US priorities in the First, Third, and Fifth Committees. -- Information on efforts by the EU or other member states to secure additional voting rights in the UN and its specialized agencies. -- Lobbying by member states for committee membership assignments or vice presidencies. -- Information on current and likely future leadership of regional groups, blocs, and coalitions. -- Differences over positions between UN missions and their respective capitals. -- Voting instructions to delegations on key resolutions. -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of key committee chairs; member views of issues that come before these committees. -- Efforts of Third World countries to moderate, via NAM and G-77, Third World positions on development, defamation of religion, or human rights issues. -- Intentions of UN members to use non-UN bodies and working groups to bypass perceived UN bureaucracy. -- Perceptions of member states of the viability and potential impact of the US-backed Democracy Caucus. -- Biographical and biometric information on key NAM/G-77/OIC Permanent Representatives, particularly China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Senegal, and Syria; information on their relationships with their capitals.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, OIC, UN
G. Other Substantive Issues
1) Food Security (FOOD-3). -- Status and proposals related to the UN Comprehensive
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Framework for Action to address the global food crisis. -- WFP activities and proposals related to reforming donor food aid policies and establishing a new standing global fund to address regularly occurring food crises. -- WFP and FAO plans and proposals regarding the impact on food prices and food security of the growing use of ethanol and biofuels. -- Internal UN responses to international calls for reform of FAO and WFP.
Countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Haiti, Iraq, Japan, Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe International Organizations: FAO, UN, World Animal Health Organization Non-State Entities: Palestinian Authority, West Bank and Gaza Strip
2) Climate Change, Energy, and Environment (ENVR-4). -- Country preparations for the December 2009 Copenhagen UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Meeting. -- Developments related to other UNFCCC meetings and discussions on a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. -- Perceptions of key negotiators on US positions in environmental negotiations. -- Developments on the Montreal Protocol, including reactions to US efforts to limit hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). -- Indications that member states working through the UN and its specialized agencies are/are not fostering environmental cooperation, partnerships and capacity building between and among member states and regional and sub-regional organizations. -- Monitoring of and compliance with UN-sponsored environmental treaties; evidence of treaty circumvention. -- Information on adherence to member states' own national environmental programs, including protection, monitoring, and cleanup efforts. -- Efforts by treaty secretariats to influence treaty negotiations or compliance. -- Information on the Convention on Biological Diversity, particularly on access, benefit sharing and bio-safety. -- Information on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including potential efforts to modify or amend its provisions. -- Information on excessive maritime claims, including those relating to ridges. -- Information on efforts to develop a mechanism to add chemicals to the list of persistent organic pollutants. -- Information and perceptions on the strategic approach to international chemicals management, especially efforts of the EU's management program. -- Information on participation in and compliance with the UN Basel Convention. -- Status of efforts to set standards to promote
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environmental protection, including protection of forests, desertification, and invasive or endangered species. -- Efforts within the UN to protect water resources, and to promote development of alternative sources of energy.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, UN
3) Transnational Economic Issues (ECFS-4H). -- Information on efforts by UN member states or organizations to promote or obstruct regulatory reform, including banking and financial reforms, transparency, international law, trade, development, and foreign direct investment to reflect the Monterrey anti-poverty consensus and the Millennium Development Goals. -- Plans, intentions, and tactics of the UNGA President regarding international financial problems; views of member states regarding these plans. -- Plans and intentions of member states to support US priorities related to economic freedom and promotion of democracy. -- Secretariat or member plans to develop multilateral economic, trade, or development agreements impinging on US interests. -- Efforts by member states and the Secretariat to reconcile international differences over globalization, especially the perceived impact of globalization on human rights, labor, and environmental issues. -- Member positions on UN decisions, plans, and activities concerning environmentally sustainable economic growth through market economies, free trade, private investment, and efficient multilateral development assistance. -- Efforts to expand the global compact involving corporations committed to observing human rights, environmental, and labor standards. -- SYG's views and statements on trade issues and efforts to influence future World Trade Organization rounds. -- Plans and intentions of UN member states that may impact freedom of navigation. -- Information on international taxation initiatives.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, FAO, International Financial Institutions and Infrastructures, UN, World Bank, World Trade Organization
4) Arms Control and Treaty Monitoring (ACTM-4). -- Plans, tactics, timetables, and draft proposals for the Eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and especially
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information related to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone initiative, from interested individual member states (especially China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, and South Africa) and like-minded groups such as the NAM and the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden). -- Member state views of the major problems facing the NPT; whether or under what conditions states would consider withdrawing from the NPT. -- Member views on and responses to US plans and policies on missile defense and positions on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, particularly those of Russia, China, and Pakistan. -- Information on IAEA plans for safeguards, international fuel banks, or other nuclear fuel supply arrangements, and meetings of the Board of Governors at the IAEA. -- Member views on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); prospects for country ratifications and entry into force. -- Member plans for plenary meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group; views of the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. -- Readiness of member states to reform the agenda of the UN General Assembly's First Committee; proposals prepared by member states for the First Committee. -- Views of key delegations on US proposals on land mines. -- Tactical and substantive information regarding periodic arms control meetings in New York, Geneva, Vienna and elsewhere, including the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review process, UN experts group on missiles, and meetings on conventional arms. -- Plans and intentions of member states to introduce new arms control or proliferation prevention measures or make significant changes to existing agreements. - Member or Secretariat plans to address WMD proliferation, safeguards, arms control and disarmament, or other threat reduction efforts. -- Foreign attitudes on UN-sanctioned arms control negotiations. -- Biographic and biometric data on, and positions of key UN arms control interlocutors, especially candidates for the position of Director General of the IAEA, and the heads of other international institutions.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, IAEA, International Arms Control Organizations, NATO, OSCE, UN
5) Health Issues (HLTH-4). -- UN, WHO, and other international organizations,
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forecasts, expected impacts, plans, proposals, key studies, and reactions to major health crises and other health-related issues, including efforts on disease eradication, improving health standards and access to care and medicine, and programs to monitor and respond to emerging infectious disease outbreaks and other disasters or emergencies. -- Information on deliberations in the UN and other international health organizations on health issues and the policy positions and objectives of member states and key figures, including compromises, insertions, and items omitted in published declarations and studies. -- Information on international health organizations, relationships and interactions with countries and other organizations, including relationships with regional offices or subsidiaries. -- Details on limits and restrictions placed on international organizations to investigate reports of diseases that pose an international threat, including restrictions placed on the nationality of members of investigation teams. -- Details on disease transparency, particularly indications about inconsistent reporting of outbreaks to appropriate international organizations and delivery of specimens to WHO- and FAO-affiliated laboratories, and including discussions or agreements impacting the publicly disclosed occurrence of diseases. -- Details of discussions related to the accessibility of HIV/AIDS drugs (antiretroviral drugs or ARVs). -- Details related to the availability, accessibility, and regulation of health care, particularly medications, vaccines, and counterfeits. -- Member state attitudes toward maintenance of smallpox stocks. -- Information on global counterfeit medications to include surveillance, countermeasures, and research and development issues. -- Details on efforts to implement health-related Millennium Development Goals. -- Details on corruption in international health organizations or the corrupt use of goods and services provided for health issues by bilateral and multilateral donors and international health organizations, including WHO, UNAIDS, FAO, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. -- Details on irregularities in Global Fund fundraising, spending, and treatment of whistle blowers. -- Personalities, biographic and biometric information, roles, effectiveness, management styles, and influence of key health officials, to include the Director General of the WHO, head of UNAIDS, the Pan American Health Organization, under Secretaries, heads of specialized agencies and their chief advisers, and top aides.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
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Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, FAO, UN, World Animal Health Organization, WHO
6) Terrorism (TERR-5H). -- Information on plans and intentions of UN bodies and member states to respond to or address within UN fora the worldwide terrorist threat. -- Structure, plans and key figures of UN counterterrorism strategy. -- Information on plans and activities of UNSC,s four counterterrorism sub-bodies. -- Plans and intentions of member states to address terrorism by implementing anti-terrorism legislation as called for under resolutions, particularly as they relate to tracking financial transactions. -- Views of member states on US policy toward terrorism. -- Efforts of member states to support or oppose activities undertaken by UN specialized agencies such as the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization to improve maritime and airline security. -- Information on UN support for technical assistance to member states to combat terrorism, particularly in Africa. -- Views of member states about inclusion or exclusion of terrorism against Israel in counterterrorism efforts and definition of terrorism. -- (For further requirements, see the NHCD on Terrorism Threats to US Interests at Home and Abroad, July 13, 2005.)
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN
7) Trafficking, Social, and Women's Issues (DEPS-5H). -- Plans and intentions of member states to support or oppose US priority to combat trafficking and exploitation of men, women, and children. -- Member state perceptions of ability of UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to follow through on strategies to support women and children through UN specialized bodies. -- Information on member efforts to combat organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and trafficking in persons. -- Plans and intentions of member states to address reproductive issues, including the aims of the EU vis-a-vis the US, GRULAC, Arab, and OIC nations. -- Member state perceptions or plans regarding efforts to reconcile religious differences worldwide. -- Information on reforms undertaken within the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and future plans of the organization. -- Member views on education initiatives.
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Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, OIC, UN
H. Intelligence and Security Topics
1) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
2) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
3) Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations (FPOL-1). -- Influence of key UN-affiliated foreign NGOs on UN decision-making. -- Efforts of foreign NGOs to undermine US policy initiatives. -- Foreign NGO role in, views toward, and influence on UN policies and activities on globalization, justice, human rights, the environment, and family/women/children/reproductive issues. -- Ability and capacity of foreign NGOs to assist refugees, displaced persons, and victims of disasters through the UNHCR and WFP. -- Ability and capacity of foreign NGOs to support the UN Environmental Program or national efforts with environmental protection, pollution monitoring, and cleanup efforts. -- Contacts between foreign NGOs and Secretariat staff that could involve sharing of confidential data. -- Foreign efforts to strip US or foreign NGOs of UN affiliation and to block US or foreign NGOs seeking UN affiliation. -- Efforts by member states-*particularly China, Cuba, Israel, Russia, and Islamic countries*-to obtain NGO affiliation for organizations supporting their policies. -- Efforts by organizations affiliated with terrorist organizations or foreign intelligence organizations to obtain NGO affiliation with the UN. -- Efforts by the EU through the Arhus convention to place NGOs on UN bureaus; reactions of member states to those efforts. -- Role of NGOs at the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (OHCR), OHCHR, and UNHRC in the Third Committee of the UNGA.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, OIC, UN
4) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H). -- Current technical specifications, physical layout, and planned upgrades to telecommunications infrastructure and
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information systems, networks, and technologies used by top officials and their support staffs. -- Details on commercial and private VIP networks used for official communications, to include upgrades, security measures, passwords, personal encryption keys, and types of V P N versions used. -- Telephone numbers and e-mail addresses of key officials, as well as limited distribution telephone numbers/directories and public switched networks (PSTN) telephone directories; dialing numbers for voice, datalink, video teleconferencing, wireless communications systems, cellular systems, personal communications systems, and wireless facsimiles. -- Information on hacking or other security incidents involving UN networks. -- Key personnel and functions of UN entity that maintains UN communications and computer networks. -- Indications of IO">IO">IO/IW operations directed against the UN. -- Information about current and future use of communications systems and technologies by officials or organizations, including cellular phone networks, mobile satellite phones, very small aperture terminals (VSAT), trunked and mobile radios, pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls, encryption, international connectivity, use of electronic data interchange, Voice-over-Internet protocol (VoIP), Worldwide interoperability for microwave access (Wi-Max), and cable and fiber networks.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN CLINTON
Summary
The state department asks US diplomats around the world and at UN heaquarters to provide detailed technical information, including passwords and personal encryption keys for communications networks used by UN officials. It also wants to know about potential links between UN organisations and terrorists, and any corruption in the UN. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

ኦሽንoc
Leader
Leader
Posts: 1129
Joined: 07 Aug 2009 14:20
Contact:

Re: Wikileaks and American Embassy leaked documents on Yemen

Unread post by ኦሽንoc » 30 Nov 2010 02:18

O 041333Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3474
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ASMARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
NCTC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SANAA 000004


NOFORN

DEPT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ARP
NSC FOR DPNSA BRENNAN
HQ USCENTCOM/CCCC-CIG FOR JSEATON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR PINS MOPS MASS MCAP SA
AE, UK, ER, DJ, QA, YM
SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS' MEETING WITH SALEH ON SECURITY
ASSISTANCE, AQAP STRIKES

REF: 2009 SANAA 1430


Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Commander of the U.S. Central Command
General David Petraeus congratulated President Saleh on
recent successful operations against AQAP, and informed him
that U.S. security assistance to the ROYG would increase to
USD 150 million in 2010, including USD 45 million to equip
and train a CT-focused aviation regiment under the Yemeni
Special Operations Forces. Saleh requested that the U.S.
provide 12 armed helicopters and train and equip three new
Republican Guard brigades. Saleh rejected the General's
proposal to have USG personnel armed with direct-feed
intelligence present inside the area of CT operations, but
agreed to a have U.S. fixed-wing bombers circle outside
Yemeni territory ready to engage AQAP targets should
actionable intelligence become available. END SUMMARY.

SALEH: HELICOPTERS, HELICOPTERS, HELICOPTERS
--------------------------------------------

¶2. (S/NF) CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus,
accompanied by the Ambassador, CENTCOM aides, the Embassy
DATT, and EconOff note taker, congratulated President Saleh
on successful operations against AQAP during a January 2
meeting. The General told Saleh that he had requested USD
150 million in security assistance for 2010, a substantial
increase over the 2009 amount of USD 67 million. Also
present were Minister of Defense MG Muhammed Nasser Ahmad Ali
and Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Affairs
Rashad al-Alimi. Raising a topic that he would manage to
insert into almost every item of discussion during the hour
and half-long meeting, Saleh requested that the U.S. provide
the ROYG with 12 armed helicopters. Possessing such
helicopters would allow the ROYG to take the lead in future
CT operations, "ease" the use of fighter jets and cruise
missiles against terrorist targets, and allow Yemeni Special
Operations Forces to capture terrorist suspects and identify
victims following strikes, according to Saleh. The U.S.
could convince Saudi Arabia and the UAE to supply six
helicopters each if the American "bureaucracy" prevented
quick approval, Saleh suggested. The General responded that
he had already considered the ROYG's request for helicopters
and was in discussions with Saudi Arabia on the matter. "We
won't use the helicopters in Sa'ada, I promise. Only against
al-Qaeda," Saleh told General Petraeus.

¶3. (S/NF) Saleh agreed to General Patraeus' proposal to
dedicate USD 45 million of 2010 security assistance funds to
help establish and train a YSOF aviation regiment, allowing
YSOF to focus on al-Qaeda targets and leaving Sa'ada air
operations to the Yemeni Air Force. Without giving much
detail, Saleh also requested that the U.S. equip and train
three new Republican Guard brigades, totaling 9,000 soldiers.
"Equipping these brigades would reflect upon our true
partnership," Saleh said. The General urged Saleh to focus
first on the YSOF aviation regiment.

AQAP STRIKES: CONCERN FOR CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
---------------------------------------------

¶4. (S/NF) Saleh praised the December 17 and 24 strikes
against AQAP but said that "mistakes were made" in the
killing of civilians in Abyan. The General responded that
the only civilians killed were the wife and two children of
an AQAP operative at the site, prompting Saleh to plunge into
a lengthy and confusing aside with Deputy Prime Minister
Alimi and Minister of Defense Ali regarding the number of
terrorists versus civilians killed in the strike. (Comment:
Saleh's conversation on the civilian casualties suggests he
has not been well briefed by his advisors on the strike in
Abyan, a site that the ROYG has been unable to access to
determine with any certainty the level of collateral damage.
End Comment.) AQAP leader Nassr al-Wahishi and extremist
cleric Anwar al-Awlaki may still be alive, Saleh said, but
the December strikes had already caused al-Qaeda operatives
to turn themselves in to authorities and residents in
affected areas to deny refuge to al-Qaeda. Saleh raised the
issue of the Saudi Government and Jawf governorate tribal
sheikh Amin al-Okimi, a subject that is being reported
through other channels.

SHIFTING AIRSTRIKE STRATEGIES
-----------------------------

¶5. (S/NF) President Obama has approved providing U.S.
intelligence in support of ROYG ground operations against
AQAP targets, General Petraeus informed Saleh. Saleh reacted
coolly, however, to the General's proposal to place USG
personnel inside the area of operations armed with real-time,
direct feed intelligence from U.S. ISR platforms overhead.
"You cannot enter the operations area and you must stay in
the joint operations center," Saleh responded. Any U.S.
casualties in strikes against AQAP would harm future efforts,
Saleh asserted. Saleh did not have any objection, however,
to General Petraeus' proposal to move away from the use of
cruise missiles and instead have U.S. fixed-wing bombers
circle outside Yemeni territory, "out of sight," and engage
AQAP targets when actionable intelligence became available.
Saleh lamented the use of cruise missiles that are "not very
accurate" and welcomed the use of aircraft-deployed
precision-guided bombs instead. "We'll continue saying the
bombs are ours, not yours," Saleh said, prompting Deputy
Prime Minister Alimi to joke that he had just "lied" by
telling Parliament that the bombs in Arhab, Abyan, and Shebwa
were American-made but deployed by the ROYG.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT IN MIL-MIL RELATIONS
-----------------------------------------

¶6. (S/NF) General Petraeus praised cooperation between the
Embassy and the NSB, YSOF, Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG), and
Counterterrorism Unit (CTU), but singled out relations with
the Yemeni Air Force as problematic. Only four out of 50
planned U.S. Special Operations Forces Command training
missions with the Yemeni Air Force had actually been executed
in the past year, he said. Saleh said he would personally
instruct Minister of Defense to improve the situation. The
General also urged Saleh to stop Yemeni Customs' habit of
holding up Embassy cargo at the airport, including shipments
destined for the ROYG itself, such as equipment for the CTU.
Saleh laughed and made a vague pledge to have the customs
issue "taken care of." Saleh complained that the ROYG had
not yet received the necessary training to operate 17 Iraqi
Light Armored Vehicle (ILAVs) provided by the USG in 2008,
saying that YSOF needed the training in order to use the
ILAVs for CT operations. The General said he would look into
having U.S. Special Operations Forces personnel conduct the
training.

¶7. (S/NF) Pointing to the ROYG's problems in combating
rampant drug and arms smuggling, Saleh told General Petraeus
that U.S. maritime security assistance was insufficient to
cover Yemen's nearly 2,000 km of coastline. "Why not have
Italy, Germany, Holland, Japan, Saudi, and the UAE each
provide two patrol boats?" Saleh suggested. The General told
Saleh that two fully-equipped 87-foot patrol boats destined
for the Yemeni Coast Guard were under construction and would
arrive in Yemen within a year. Saleh singled out smuggling
from Djibouti as particularly troublesome, claiming that the
ROYG had recently intercepted four containers of
Djibouti-origin TNT. "Tell (Djiboutian President) Ismail
Guelleh that I don't care if he smuggles whiskey into Yemen
-- provided it's good whiskey ) but not drugs or weapons,"
Saleh joked. Saleh said that smugglers of all stripes are
bribing both Saudi and Yemeni border officials.

SALEH WELCOMES LONDON CONFERENCE
--------------------------------

¶8. (S/NF) Saleh told the General that he welcomed PM Gordon
Brown's announcement of the London conference and said that
the cooperation on Yemen between the U.S., EU, Saudi Arabia,
and the UAE would be benefitial. Qatar should not be
involved, however, because "they work with Iran." In this
regard, Saleh also identified Qatar as one of those nations
working "against Yemen," along with Iran, Libya, and Eritrea.


¶9. (U) General Petraeus did not have an opportunity to clear
on this cable.


SECHE

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Wikileaks US embassy cables: Ethiopian Meles Zenawi meeting

Unread post by ኦሽንoc » 05 Dec 2010 11:14

Wikileaks US embassy cables: Ethiopian Meles Zenawi meeting with US Officials Maria Otero and Johnnie Carson

guardian.co.uk, Friday 3 December 2010

Tuesday, 02 February 2010, 05:38
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000163
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/01/2020
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KDEM, MOPS, ECON, KE, ET
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY OTERO'S MEETING WITH ETHIOPIAN
PRIME MINISTER MELES ZENAWI - JANUARY 31, 2010
Classified By: Under Secretary Maria Otero for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (SBU) January 31, 2010; 4:15 p.m.; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
2. (SBU) Participants:
U.S. Under Secretary Otero Assistant Secretary Carson NSC Senior Director for African Affairs Michelle Gavin PolOff Skye Justice (notetaker)
Ethiopia Prime Minister Meles Zenawi Special Assistant Gebretensae Gebremichael
Summary
-------
3. (C) Prime Minister Meles Zenawi told Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs Maria Otero his government placed no restrictions on its citizens' democratic and civil rights, only the right of foreign entities to fund them. Foreign funding of civil society organizations (CSOs) is antithetical to democratization, he said, as it makes civil society leaders accountable to foreign entities rather than their own members, turning the concept of democratic accountability on its head. Democracy in Ethiopia must develop organically, and Ethiopians must organize and fund themselves and defend their own rights. Meles assured U/S Otero that Ethiopia's upcoming elections will be free, fair, transparent, and peaceful, and elaborated steps his government has taken to ensure this. While opposition groups may resort to violence in an attempt to discredit the election, the GoE will enforce the recently enacted Electoral Code of Conduct and its existing election laws without regard to party affiliation. Meles said he has warned opposition leaders that the international community will not be able to save them should they violate Ethiopian law, but rather if they do so they will face the same fate as opposition leader Birtukan Midekssa, who will "vegetate in jail forever." The U.S. delegation noted that Ethiopia's forthcoming elections would be closely watched in the U.S., and urged Meles to exercise wise judgment and leadership, give the opposition more political space, and consider the release of Birtukan Midekssa.
4. (C) Meles said the GoE is not enthusiastic about Kenya's Jubaland initiative, but is sharing intelligence with Kenya and hoping for success. In the event the initiative is not successful, the GoE has plans in place to limit the destabilizing impacts on Ethiopia. On climate change, Meles said the GoE fully supports the Copenhagen accord, but is disappointed with signs the U.S. may not support his proposed panel to monitor international financial contributions under the accord. Meles made no substantive comment on inquiries regarding the liberalization of banking and telecommunications in Ethiopia. End summary.
Foreign Funding of CSOs Antithetical to Democratization
--------------------------------------------- ----------
5. (C) Prime Minister Meles Zenawi told U/S Otero the development of a strong democracy and civil society is the only way Ethiopia can ensure peace and unity among an ethnically and religiously divided population. He noted that the Government of Ethiopia's (GoE) commitment to democracy is directly related to stability, adding that for Ethiopia, "democratization is a matter of survival." Responding to U/S Otero's concern that Ethiopia's recently-enacted CSO law threatened the role of civil society, Meles said while the GoE welcomes foreign funding of charities, those Ethiopians who want to engage in political activity should organize and fund themselves. The leaders of CSOs that receive foreign funding are not accountable to their organizations, he said, but rather to the sources of their funding, turning the concept of democratic accountability on its head. Meles asserted that Ethiopians were not too poor to organize themselves and establish their own democratic traditions, recalling that within his lifetime illiterate peasants and poor students had overthrown an ancient imperial dynasty.
6. (C) Meles said his country's inability to develop a strong democracy was not due to insufficient understanding of democratic principles, but rather because Ethiopians had not
ADDIS ABAB 00000163 002 OF 003
internalized those principles. Ethiopia should follow the example of the U.S. and European countries, he said, where democracy developed organically and citizens had a stake in its establishment. When people are committed to democracy and forced to make sacrifices for it, Meles said, "they won't let any leader take it away from them." But "when they are spoon-fed democracy, they will give it up when their source of funding and encouragement is removed." Referencing his own struggle against the Derg regime, Meles said he and his compatriots received no foreign funding, but were willing to sacrifice and die for their cause, and Ethiopians today must take ownership of their democratic development, be willing to sacrifice for it, and defend their own rights.
7. (C) Meles drew a clear distinction between Ethiopians' democratic and civil rights on the one hand, and the right of foreign entities to fund those rights on the other. There is no restriction on Ethiopians' rights, he asserted, merely on foreign funding, adding that the U.S. has similar laws. U/S Otero countered that while the U.S. does not allow foreign funding of political campaigns, there is no restriction on foreign funding of NGOs. Ms. Gavin noted the examples of foreign support for the abolitionist movement in the U.S. and for the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa as positive examples of foreign engagement of civil society, and expressed that aside from the issue of foreign funding, the ability of local organizations to legally register, operate, and contribute to democratic discourse was of tantamount importance.
GoE Will Hold Free and Fair Elections, Despite Opposition
--------------------------------------------- ------------
8. (C) Meles assured U/S Otero that Ethiopia's upcoming electoral process will be free, fair, transparent, and peaceful. The GoE has learned from the violence that followed the 2005 elections, he said, and taken action to ensure that violence is not repeated. Meles said the recently signed Electoral Code of Conduct (CoC) was not done for the benefit of political parties, but for the Ethiopian people. The people will ultimately judge political actors, he said, and they must have parameters agreed to by the parties by which they will judge those actors. After the CoC was passed, Meles noted, the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) gathered over 1,300 of its senior leaders to discuss party strategy and train all leaders on the CoC. The EPRDF knows violations of the CoC by its members will hurt the party and provide a rallying cry for the opposition. This message will flow down to all EPRDF members, he said, so that they know what is expected of them, and know both the courts and the party will hold them accountable to the CoC.
9. (C) Meles told U/S Otero he feared a repeat of the 2005 violence, and that many opposition members were not interested in peaceful elections, but would rather discredit the electoral process. As such, the EPRDF cannot give them any excuse to resort to violence. Meles noted that in addition to opposition political parties, the GoE had intelligence that the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki were all directly or indirectly involved in plots to discredit the elections. The EPRDF, he said, would "let them be" to show the population that even though their opponents' goal is not peace, the EPRDF will abide by the law.
10. (C) Meles recalled that in 2005, he had told opposition leaders in the presence of the diplomatic corps that they should not believe foreign allies would protect them if they violated the laws of Ethiopia. Opposition leaders were right to believe the diplomatic corps would try to protect them, he said, as evidenced by the statement they issued demanding the release of opposition politicians upon their arrest in 2005. Today, Meles said, foreign embassies are inadvertently conveying the same message, that they will protest the jailing of opposition leaders and potentially take action against Ethiopia to secure their release. However, the GoE has made clear to both opposition and EPRDF leaders that nothing can protect them except the laws and constitution of Ethiopia, and the GoE will clamp down on anyone who violates those laws. "We will crush them with our full force," Meles said, and "they will vegetate like Birtukan (Midekssa) in jail forever."
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11. (C) In an extended discussion in response to Meles' comments, U/S Otero, A/S Carson, and Ms. Gavin noted that Ethiopia's forthcoming elections would be closely watched in the U.S. and that the GoE's treatment of the opposition would be subject to public criticism by the Ethiopian diaspora and U.S. political figures. The U.S. delegation urged Meles to exercise wise judgment and leadership, give the opposition more political space, and consider the release of Birtukan Midekssa. A/S Carson stressed the importance of putting Ethiopia's democracy on an upward and positive trajectory, and not letting it atrophy or slide backward, using the suffrage and civil rights movements in the U.S. as an illustration of challenges the U.S. has faced as it improved its own democratic system. (Note: Three quarters of the nearly two-hour meeting focused on democracy. End note.)
Ethiopia Not Enthusiastic About Jubaland Initiative
--------------------------------------------- ------
12. (C) Meles said he had been briefed extensively regarding Kenya's Jubaland initiative. Because Ethiopia had previously intervened in Somalia without seeking Kenyan approval, he said, the GoE would not presume to analyze the Kenyans' chances for success in their own intervention. The GoE is sharing intelligence with Kenya, but Meles expressed a lack of confidence in Kenya's capacity to pull off a tactical success, which he feared could have negative regional impacts. The GoE is therefore working to minimize the likelihood of a spillover effect in Ethiopia's Somali Regional State. Noting that Ethiopia might have underestimated Kenya, Meles said, "We are not enthusiastic, but we are hoping for success."
GoE Prepared to Move Forward from Copenhagen
--------------------------------------------
13. (C) U/S Otero urged Meles to sign the Copenhagen accord on climate change and explained that it is a point of departure for further discussion and movement forward on the topic. She noted that while the agreement has its limitations, it has the international community moving in the right direction. Meles responded that the GoE supported the accord in Copenhagen and would support it at the AU Summit. However, he expressed his disappointment that despite President Obama's personal assurance to him that finances committed in Copenhagen would be made available, he had received word from contacts at the UN that the U.S. was not supportive of Ethiopia's proposal for a panel to monitor financial pledges regarding climate change. Ms. Gavin assured the Prime Minister that she would look into his concerns.
No Promises on Liberalizing Telecoms, Banking
---------------------------------------------
14. (C) U/S Otero and A/S Carson encouraged Meles to hasten steps to liberalize the telecommunications and banking industries in Ethiopia, and highlighted both the micro- and macroeconomic benefits of liberalization. Meles offered no substantive response to A/S Carson's query whether any progress had been made toward liberalizing or otherwise improving telecommunications, joking that Americans' concept of time was much faster than Ethiopians'. In response to U/S Otero's recognition of the important role of private banks in microfinance projects that directly benefit the poor, and assurance that private and state-owned banks could thrive side-by-side, Meles said he would be happy to discuss the issue in the future. YATES
Summary
The failed Copenhagen climate change summit produced only a non-binding Accord, but the agreement suits US interests as it presents more chance of forcing China to act. US diplomats campaign hard around the world for support for the Accord. Here, the US bluntly urges Ethiopia, whose Prime Minister leads the African Union's climate negotiations. By November 2010, 140 nations have backed the Accord, at the upper end of the US target. Key passage highlighted in Bold

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